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Article 
Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and 
Charitable Giving 
Miranda Perry Fleischer† 
“In charity there is no excess.” 
Sir Francis Bacon1 
 
Charities play a vital role in our society. In addition to en-
hancing pluralism, private philanthropy meets many societal 
needs more efficiently, creatively, and effectively than govern-
ment alone. Schools ranging from Ivy League universities to 
small private kindergartens teach our youth and advance 
knowledge. Religious organizations offer spiritual comfort to 
millions of Americans, while groups as diverse as neighborhood 
health clinics and the Gates Foundation improve the health of 
countless others. The Red Cross and the Salvation Army aid 
thousands of distressed individuals each year, while art institu-
tions ranging from the Metropolitan Opera to neighborhood 
community theaters enrich American culture. 
Given the charitable sector’s importance and value, it is 
not surprising that the Internal Revenue Code encourages cha-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
†  Associate Professor and Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Scholar, 
The University of Illinois College of Law. I would like to thank Ellen Aprill, 
Johnny Rex Buckles, John Colombo, Noel Cunningham, Nestor Davidson, Lee 
Fennell, Victor Fleischer, Amanda Frost, Daniel Halperin, Al Harberger, Clare 
Huntington, Bill Klein, Lloyd Mayer, Ajay Mehrotra, Julie Roin, Deborah 
Schenk, Larry Solum, Kirk Stark, Phil Weiser, David Zaring, Larry Zelenak, 
and Eric Zolt for insightful comments, as well as participants in the 2006 Ju-
nior Tax Scholars’ Workshop, the UCLA Tax Policy Colloquium, and faculty 
workshops at the University of Colorado and the University of Illinois for the 
same. I would also like to thank Kamille Curylo-Delcour and Andrew Tessman 
for wonderful research assistance. Copyright © 2008 by Miranda Perry 
Fleischer. 
 1.  FRANCIS BACON, OF GOODNESS, AND GOODNESS OF NATURE, in ES-
SAYS CIVIL AND MORAL (1625), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 
271 (1826). 
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ritable giving by allowing a deduction for charitable donations.2 
What is surprising is that the code treats the most generous 
among us less favorably than those of average generosity. This 
mismatch stems from one of the most puzzling limits in the In-
ternal Revenue Code: the cap that prevents an individual from 
claiming a charitable deduction greater than fifty percent of 
her income, even if she gives more than half her income to 
charity.3 As a result, someone who generously donates all her 
income to charity must still pay income tax. 
Neither the fifty-percent limit nor the broad principle it 
represents are well-theorized. Only a few scholars have ex-
plored the question of whether an individual who gives all her 
income to charity should also pay income tax or whether the 
tax code’s current limits are appropriate.4 Those who have ad-
dressed this issue appear hard-pressed to find a satisfactory 
justification for limiting one’s deduction.5 Only one explana-
tion—that the cap serves as a crude alternative minimum tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 2. See I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2008). 
 3. See id. § 170(b)(1). As explained in Part I, this fifty-percent limit ap-
plies only to cash contributions to public charities. Limits of thirty percent or 
twenty percent apply in other instances, depending on the asset donated and 
the recipient charity. See id. Similar limits apply to corporations: generally, 
they can deduct no more than ten percent of their income. Id. § 170(b)(2). 
While the corporate provisions are interesting and merit further study else-
where, this Article focuses only on the individual limit. 
 4. Some scholars have, however, criticized the current limits on a prac-
tical level for dampening giving by creating unnecessary complexity. C. Eu-
gene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giv-
ing: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable 
Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 411–12 (1995). 
 5. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Bequests and the Federal Estate 
Tax: Proposed Restrictions on Deductibility, The Seventh Mortimer H. Hess 
Memorial Lecture, in 31 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK, 1976, at 168–70 (discussing the implications of percentage 
limits on charitable bequests); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of 
Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 
23–25 (2002) (asserting that arguments defending percentage limits “have 
merit” but “are not overwhelming”). Only a handful of scholars have proffered 
explanations with which they appear at least somewhat satisfied. See, e.g., 
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contri-
butions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 985–86 (2005) (“To allow all of the re-
sources of the wealthy to fund those charitable activities that they value, at 
the cost of denying the federal government any control over the use of such 
funds, may simply be politically unacceptable. . . .”); Steuerle & Sullivan, su-
pra note 4, at 413–15 (suggesting that the cap may serve to limit government 
outlays or as an alternative minimum tax). 
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ensuring that everyone above a certain economic income pays 
some tax—has gained any scholarly traction.6 
That explanation is insufficient. The alternative minimum 
tax (AMT)7 addresses the results of some tax preferences that 
allow individuals to retain substantial economic income for 
their own use that goes untaxed.8 This justification for the 
AMT, however, does not apply to tax preferences for charitable 
contributions. By definition, someone who makes a charitable 
donation does not retain the gifted assets for her own use. The 
minimum tax explanation therefore does not satisfactorily an-
swer the question whether, if an individual keeps no income for 
herself and instead donates it all to a cause worthy enough to 
merit a charitable deduction—such as feeding the poor, sup-
porting educational institutions, or funding the arts—she 
should still pay some income tax. 
This Article is the first of two that seek better to answer 
the question of whether limiting the ability of taxpayers who 
make substantial contributions to take a charitable deduction 
is justified.9 This two-part series answers that question in the 
affirmative, relying on two complementary theories. The first is 
based on economic theory; the second is rooted in political phi-
losophy. 
This first Article articulates the economic argument, which 
is grounded in the existing public goods literature. That body of 
work posits that a subsidy for charitable donations is war-
ranted because a democratic process dependent on majority 
preferences10 will supply public goods only at the level de-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 6. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 414; see also infra note 173. 
 7.  See I.R.C. § 55 (2000) (codifying the alternative minimum tax). 
 8. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 8–12 (1969), reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1653–56 (noting reasons for enacting the alternative min-
imum tax). 
 9. As explained in Part I, the current subsidy is structured as a deduc-
tion that is limited to some portion of one’s adjusted gross income. Another 
way of subsidizing charity while precluding a taxpayer from “zeroing out” her 
tax liability would be a credit for charitable contributions limited to some por-
tion of her tentative liability. My goal is not to explore whether the current 
rule—a limited deduction rather than a limited credit—is justified, or even 
whether a deduction is preferable to a credit. Rather, the broader question I 
explore is whether subsidizing charitable donations while still requiring do-
nors to pay some income tax is justified. 
 10. Although I recognize that majority preferences do not always prevail 
due to intrinsic characteristics of our legislative system, I take the majorita-
rian model in the public goods literature on the charitable deduction as my 
starting point. See, e.g., JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE 
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manded by the median voter.11 This majority, which I term the 
“classic majority,” therefore supplies some public goods (for ex-
ample, a lighthouse or national defense), but not others (per-
haps a community theater). Individuals supporting the under-
supplied public goods then coalesce to form what I term a “new 
majority” that agrees to provide partial funding (via a tax sub-
sidy) for each individual’s preferred minority projects.12 In that 
manner, charitable tax subsidies allow individuals whose pre-
ferences differ from the classic majority to redirect a portion of 
funds otherwise flowing to the federal treasury toward their 
preferred visions of the public good. 
Two majorities now exist simultaneously: the classic major-
ity, which has agreed to fund the lighthouse, national defense, 
and other projects not suffering from government failure,13 and 
the new majority, which has coalesced for the purpose of ap-
proving partial funding for minority-preferred projects.14 By 
definition, some voters are members of both groups. How can 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
TAX EXEMPTION 101–02 (1995); Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the 
Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21, 24–25 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). Exist-
ing literature recognizes that majority votes do not always determine political 
outcomes but uses the majoritarian model for simplicity. COLOMBO & HALL, 
supra; Weisbrod, supra, at 23–24. I explore the possible role of limits on the 
charitable subsidy in non-majoritarian situations in Part IV.E. 
 11. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see infra Part III.A.1. 
 12. I refer to these as “minority” projects because the classic majority 
voted not to fund them. 
 13. Many government projects are not “public goods” in the economic 
sense. The point, however, is that the legislative process only funds projects 
(whether public goods or not) that do not suffer from government failure. 
 14. Not all projects undertaken by nonprofits constitute public goods in 
the economic sense. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution 
Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (1988). Although the requirements of 
§ 501(c)(3) and § 170 generally ensure that their partial subsidies flow to or-
ganizations providing public goods, their contours are imperfect. Id. at 1398; 
see also COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108. Not all organizations provid-
ing public goods qualify for such subsidies, and not all qualifying groups pro-
vide public goods. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108. Generally speak-
ing, however, groups qualifying for subsidies that do not provide pure public 
goods in the economic sense either provide impure public goods or provide 
some other “public benefit” to society. Id. at 109. In other words, there are 
limits on which projects may receive these subsidies; one cannot qualify for a 
partial subsidy for just any project not funded by the government. 
The point for purposes of this Article is that some individuals with a dif-
ferent view of what projects are good for society (including pure public goods, 
impure public goods, and other “public benefiting” projects) coalesce to receive 
partial funding for these projects. Because the literature with which I am 
working speaks of “public goods,” I will continue to use that term. 
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these two majorities exist simultaneously? How do voters who 
are members of both majorities balance their competing inter-
ests? Current literature ignores these questions. 
This Article argues that these two majorities strike a bar-
gain with each other, which I term the “dual-majority bargain,” 
by splitting the governmental “pie” equally:15 the classic major-
ity will fund the new majority’s preferred projects only to the 
extent the new majority agrees to fund the classic majority’s 
preferred projects, and vice versa. Limiting an individual’s cha-
ritable deduction to half of her income implements this bargain 
by ensuring that the amount of governmental subsidy for the 
individual’s preferred projects will not exceed the amount of 
taxes she pays to fund the classic majority’s projects.16 This 
bargain-saving role is, I argue, a compelling explanation for 
precluding a taxpayer from erasing her tax liability by making 
charitable contributions. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the income tax 
charitable deduction and the current percentage-of-income li-
mitations. Part II explores whether the base-measurement 
theory for the deduction justifies limiting an individual’s deduc-
tion to some portion of her income, and concludes that, at best, 
it does so only weakly. Part III explains the subsidy theory for 
the deduction, assesses existing normative theories for preclud-
ing someone from zeroing out her tax liability by making cha-
ritable contributions, and concludes that none are satisfactory. 
Part IV details the economic dual-majority bargain justifica-
tion. The Article concludes that the percentage-of-income limits 
are integral to the functioning of a democratic society because 
they enable individuals to fund cherished charities while also 
shouldering their civic responsibilities to pay for government 
projects. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 15. As explored in Part IV.C, the two majorities do not necessarily have to 
make the split fifty-fifty. Splitting down the middle, however, may reflect 
common heuristics often observed in bargaining, even in situations where par-
ties have unequal bargaining power (such as the ultimatum game). See infra 
note 215. 
 16. A tax credit limited to half of an individual’s tentative tax liability 
would have the same effect. 
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I.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
AND THE CURRENT PERCENTAGE-OF-INCOME LIMITS   
A charitable deduction has been part of the income tax 
since 1917.17 It allows individuals who make voluntary trans-
fers to organizations formed for religious, scientific, literary, 
educational, and other charitable purposes18 to deduct such 
transfers from their adjusted gross income (AGI).19 Despite the 
deduction’s longstanding place in the tax system, no consensus 
exists as to its purpose.20 As explained in Parts II and III, some 
theorists argue that the charitable deduction is necessary to 
measure income, while others believe that it is best characte-
rized as a subsidy for charitable activity.21 
Limits on the deduction have also been a permanent fix-
ture in the tax system, although their form and magnitude 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 17. John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy 
Perspective, 3 VA. TAX REV. 229, 229 & n.1 (1984). 
 18. Organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions under 
§ 170 generally are also eligible for tax-exemption under § 501(c)(3). COLOMBO 
& HALL, supra note 10, at 20. To that end, analytical interpretations of which 
purposes qualify an entity for § 170 generally apply to § 501(c)(3), and vice 
versa. Id. Interpretations of “charitable purposes” are broad and support a 
wide variety of goals: preserving the environment, providing traditional legal 
aid as well as cause-oriented public interest litigation, furthering public 
health, supporting the arts, and so on. See generally 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 
(2008). As a general rule, such organizations must provide some type of “com-
munity benefit” by fulfilling needs unmet by the private market. John D. Co-
lombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 
366 (2004). 
 19. I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2008). Very generally, AGI represents one’s 
net income after deducting from gross income the expenses of producing that 
income. See id. § 62; see also id. § 61 (defining gross income).  
 20.  See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 531, 547 (2006) (describing the theories of the charitable deduction as 
“underdetermined” and “undertheorized”). 
 21. If the purpose is to subsidize charitable giving rather than measure 
income, a tax credit would achieve the same goal and may even be more effi-
cient. Compare Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Politico-
Economic Analysis, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 10 at 272–76 (supporting a deduction), with Harold M. Hochman & James 
D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10 at 236 (supporting a 
credit). A tax credit would work as follows: Individuals would first compute 
their taxable income and tentative tax liability without regard to charitable 
contributions. Then, those making charitable contributions would be eligible to 
claim a tax credit to offset some of their tentative tax liability. MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 219–20 (5th ed. 
2005). 
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have fluctuated.22 Until the mid-1950s, the Code limited most 
people to a deduction equal to fifteen percent of their income; 
the limit rose to thirty percent in 1954 and remained at that 
level until 1969.23 Also prior to 1969, individuals whose charit-
able gifts and income taxes together surpassed ninety percent 
of their taxable income in eight of the ten preceding years were 
allowed an unlimited deduction.24 Although intended to benefit 
nuns and other individuals taking a vow of poverty, the unli-
mited deduction had an unintended consequence: it enabled 
people to donate low-basis, high-appreciation property to chari-
ty and receive an unlimited deduction based on the property’s 
high fair-market value relative to their income.25 Even though 
such individuals still retained substantial income for their own 
use, some paid no tax due to the unlimited deduction.26 Con-
gress repealed this targeted unlimited deduction in 1969, but 
although it explicitly criticized wealthy individuals who paid 
little or no tax due to the charitable deduction, the legislative 
history does not link this phenomenon to the donation of appre-
ciated property.27 Interestingly, the legislative history suggests 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 22. Initially, the deduction was limited to fifteen percent of “net taxable 
income” with no carry-forwards for any unused deduction. Vada Waters Lind-
sey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to 
the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061–63 & n.35 (2003). The limit loosened 
somewhat in 1944 when it changed to fifteen percent of AGI (because AGI is 
generally larger than net taxable income, this resulted in a higher limit). Id. 
at 1062. It rose to twenty percent of AGI in 1952 and then to thirty percent in 
1954; in 1964, Congress allowed individual carry-forwards. Id. at 1062–63 & 
n.35. The current fifty-percent limit was codified in 1969. Id. at 1065.  
 23. Id. at 1064. 
 24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C) (1964); see also R. Palmer Baker, Jr., 
The Tax Treatment of Charitable Contribution Deductions Under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, in 20 PROC. ANN. TUL. TAX INST. 327, 331 (1971). Despite 
a 1924 Senate proposal to allow an unlimited deduction to individuals who 
regularly contributed a substantial portion of their income, such a deduction 
was not implemented until 1964. Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1064. As a result, 
the unlimited deduction was in effect only five years. Interestingly, the legisla-
tive history of the 1924 proposal implies that taxing someone who was already 
benefiting society by donating large portions of his income to charitable organ-
izations seemed superfluous. The history provides that “[t]his provision is de-
signed substantially to free from income taxation one who is habitually contri-
buting to benevolent organizations amounts equalling [sic] virtually his entire 
income.” J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX LAWS, 1938-1861, at 34 (1938) (quoting S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 24 (1924)). 
 25. Halperin, supra note 5, at 24. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(b), 83 Stat. 487, 
550–53 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(b) (2000); Halperin, supra note 5, 
at 24 & n.80. 
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that fewer than 100 individuals per year used the unlimited 
deduction, albeit at a cost to the Treasury of $25 million.28 
Also in 1969, the general AGI limit rose to its current level 
of fifty percent.29 This limitation means that even if someone 
donates all her income to charity, she can only deduct up to fif-
ty percent of her income in the year of the contribution. The 
remaining amount carries forward for five years.30 The general 
fifty-percent limit applies to cash contributions to public chari-
ties.31 If some of the donor’s contributions are of appreciated 
property or are made to a private foundation,32 more stringent 
AGI limitations of thirty percent apply.33 In addition, contribu-
tions of appreciated property to private foundations are capped 
at twenty percent of AGI.34 Carry-forwards are allowed in the 
latter two scenarios as well.35 
Although the legislative history of the limits suggests they 
were intended to target a small number of wealthy taxpayers,36 
the limits apply to all income levels and affect a larger number 
of taxpayers than one might suspect. In 2003, approximately 
500,000 returns included charitable deductions carried forward 
from previous years.37 The amount of these carried-forward de-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 28. Baker, supra note 24, at 330. 
 29. Tax Reform Act § 201(b)(1)(A). 
 30. I.R.C. § 170(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2008). 
 31. “Public charities” are the organizations that spring to mind when most 
people think of the words “charity” or “nonprofit”; they include schools, home-
less shelters, tutoring programs, churches, and the like. Most such groups 
conduct charitable activities directly and obtain income from a range of 
sources, including donations from the public, dues from members, fees for ser-
vices, and grants from private foundations. “Supporting organizations,” which 
are entities that are organized and operated solely for the benefit of groups 
that conduct charitable activities directly, are also considered public charities. 
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 11.3, at 287, 
293–94 (8th ed. 2003). The term “public charity” is colloquial; these organiza-
tions are not defined as such in the Code. Id. 
 32. A “private foundation” is a charitable organization initially funded by 
a single source, such as an individual, a family, or a corporation, whose income 
comes from investments rather than fees for services or donations from the 
public, and who makes grants to other charities instead of conducting its own 
charitable activities. HOPKINS, supra note 31, at 274; see also I.R.C. § 509 
(West Supp. 2008). 
 33.  I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B)–(C). 
 34.  Id. § 170(b)(1)(D). 
 35.  Id. § 170(b)(1)(B)–(D). 
 36. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 37. Michael Parisi & Scott Hollenbeck, Individual Income Tax Returns, 
2003, in 25 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, SOI BULLETIN 9, 44 tbl.3 
(Fall 2005). Due to the manner in which the IRS reports data, the amount of 
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ductions that were usable in 2003 totaled over $25.5 billion,38 
comprising about eighteen percent of all individual income tax 
charitable deductions claimed in 2003.39 That amount exceeds 
the amounts of charitable bequests ($18.2 billion) and corporate 
giving ($11.1 billion) for 2003 and approaches the level of foun-
dation giving for that year ($26.8 billion).40 
The extent to which the limits apply to taxpayers at all in-
come levels is surprising. Of the roughly 500,000 returns claim-
ing a carried-over deduction in 2003, over 191,000 returns 
(about 38%) showed an AGI under $25,000.41 Approximately an 
additional 214,000 returns (roughly 43%) reflected an AGI be-
tween $25,000 and $100,000.42 Just over 89,000 returns (almost 
18%) showed an AGI between $100,000 and $1 million and only 
about 6500 returns (approximately 1.3%) had an AGI greater 
than $1 million.43 Because AGI reflects only current income 
and not accumulated wealth, it is likely that some of the gener-
ous lower-income taxpayers who carry forward charitable de-
ductions have substantial wealth but little current income.44 It 
is also likely, however, that others among these lower-income 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
carried-over deductions claimed in a given year is a more accessible way of 
measuring the impact of the limits rather than trying to ascertain the amount 
of deductions not claimed in a given year because of the limits. To be sure, 
however, these data do not illuminate how many contributions in a given year 
were not made at all due to the limits. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. (stating that taxpayers claimed $145.7 billion in individual 
income tax charitable deductions in 2003). 
 40. See CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 2006, at 204 
(2006). 
 41. See Parisi & Hollenbeck, supra note 37. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. An examination of estate tax data sheds light on the interplay be-
tween accumulated wealth and income. A recent ten-year panel study of indi-
viduals who died between 1996 and 1998 showed that a fair number of indi-
viduals with estates over $1 million (in 1997 dollars) had mean AGIs lower 
than $1 million for the ten years before death. See David Joulfaian, Charitable 
Giving in Life and at Death, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 350, 
355 tbl.8-3 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001). Of such decedents, more than 
five percent had a negative mean AGI, approximately one percent had a mean 
AGI between zero and $50,000, just over two percent had a mean AGI between 
$50,000 and $100,000, and about eight percent had a mean AGI between 
$100,000 and $200,000. See id. at 358 tbl.8-5. Approximately eighteen percent 
had a mean AGI between $200,000 and $500,000, and nineteen percent had a 
mean AGI between $500,000 and $1 million. See id. The remaining forty-seven 
percent had a mean AGI over $1 million. See id.  
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taxpayers do not have substantial accumulated assets and are 
considered lower or middle class.45 
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Congress temporarily 
lifted these limits for contributions made between August 28, 
2005 and December 31, 2005 by passing the Katrina Emergen-
cy Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA).46 Although prompted by 
Katrina, the Act removed the fifty-percent AGI limitation for 
cash contributions to any public charity—whether engaged in 
hurricane relief or not.47 Congress had two motivations in pass-
ing the Act. First, it wanted not only to spur giving to hurricane 
relief groups but also to assist other charities susceptible to do-
nor fatigue in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the De-
cember 2004 tsunami in Asia.48 Second, Congress sought to fo-
restall a potential drop in donations from rising gas prices and 
fears of an economic downturn.49 One year later, in the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006, Congress again temporarily lifted the 
limits in narrow circumstances: the Act excluded from income 
IRA distributions of up to $100,000 made directly to charitable 
recipients in 2006 and 2007.50 Excluding such distributions 
from a retiree’s income rendered the AGI limits inapplicable. 
Unfortunately, it is too early to estimate, even roughly, 
whether these provisions will have a long-term impact on giv-
ing.51 Early and unofficial data suggest that KETRA spurred 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 45. The Treasury study also shows, however, that mean AGI tends to rise 
with estate size. Id. at 355 tbl.8-4. Thus, it is also quite likely that some ex-
tremely charitable individuals with low AGIs do not have much accumulated 
wealth. Unfortunately, more detailed information on these taxpayers—
regarding the organizations they donate to and information on why someone 
with an AGI of only $50,000 might give more than $25,000 in a year—is un-
available. 
 46. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 
Stat. 2016, 2022–23. The Act also temporarily repealed the then three-percent 
phase-out of itemized deductions in § 68 for charitable contributions and in-
creased the corporate limit from five percent to ten percent (but only for con-
tributions to hurricane-related charities). See id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 151 CONG. REC. H8020–21 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2005) (statements of 
Reps. Hayworth & Souder); Holly Hall, A Special Katrina-Inspired Tax Break 
Produced Mixed Results for Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 26, 2006, 
at 18; Stephanie Strom, Hurricane Tax Break Spurs Triple Projected Dona-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2007, at A9. 
 49. Strom, supra note 48, at A9. 
 50. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1201(a), 120 
Stat. 780, 1063–64 (2006) (amending I.R.C. § 408(d) (2000)). 
 51. For KETRA, this is so because gifts made in 2005 will appear on re-
turns due as late as August of 2006, and a lag time exists between filing due 
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$11 billion in charitable donations, costing the Treasury more 
than $3 billion—far greater than the estimated cost of $819 
million.52 However, anecdotal evidence suggests that while 
KETRA may have encouraged some gifts that otherwise would 
have gone unmade, it also simply shifted some giving planned 
for 2006 or later into 2005, as donors fulfilled pledges early or 
otherwise sped up giving to utilize the temporary provision.53 
In the past, short-term increases in giving due to temporary, 
favorable tax provisions have been followed by short-term drops 
when the favorable provisions disappear, resulting in no real 
increase in overall gifts.54 Many experts thus do not anticipate 
a long-term increase in giving from KETRA.55 At passage, how-
ever, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated KETRA’s rev-
enue effect between 2006 and 2015 from lifting the limits and 
the three-percent phase-out to be over $871 million.56 It is un-
clear how to interpret this estimate. On the one hand, it may 
indicate that the committee expected an increase in otherwise 
unmade gifts. On the other hand, it may reflect an expectation 
that donors previously unable to deduct the full amount of their 
gifts (even with the carry-forwards) could now take a full de-
duction, meaning that overall giving was not necessarily ex-
pected to increase. Regardless of these provisions’ ultimate im-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
dates and the IRS’s release of statistics from a given set of returns. According 
to Melissa Brown, the IRS has indicated that it will not release final data on 
2005 charitable giving until the fall of 2007. Telephone Interview with Melissa 
Brown, Editor, Giving USA (Jan. 8, 2007). For the Pension Protection Act, this 
is because the provision does not expire until the end of 2007, Pension Protec-
tion Act, § 1201(a), meaning that many gifts eligible for the provision have not 
even been reported to the IRS yet. 
 52. Strom, supra note 48, at A9. 
 53. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., supra note 40, at 67. It appears 
that large charities that reached out to their donors about KETRA’s provisions 
(such as Cornell, Haverford, and the ACLU) were the main beneficiaries of 
KETRA’s largesse. Hall, supra note 48, at 18. 
 54. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., supra note 40, at 124. 
 55. For example, Patrick M. Rooney, the director of research at Indiana 
University’s Center on Philanthropy, opined that “[p]eople are using these 
special incentives to pay off pledges early and make other gifts they were 
planning on making over the next several years. . . . I don’t know that anyone 
thinks this means charity will increase dramatically over the next several 
years.” Strom, supra note 48, at A9. 
 56. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EF-
FECTS OF THE HOUSE RESOLUTION OF CONCURRENCE WITH AN AMENDMENT TO 
THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3768, THE “KATRINA EMERGENCY TAX RE-
LIEF ACT OF 2006” 1–3 (Comm. Print 2005). 
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pact, many in the charitable community believe that the AGI 
limits dampen giving.57 
II. BASE MEASUREMENT AND LIMITING THE 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
This Article explores the possibility that features intrinsic 
to the Code or to the legislative subsidy process justify a limit 
on an individual’s ability to reduce her tax liability to zero 
through charitable deductions.58 Determining whether the lim-
its are justified based on the internal logic of the Code or the 
subsidy, however, requires understanding why the Code allows 
charitable deductions in the first instance. Two rationales, de-
tailed below, predominate in justifying the deduction: the base-
measurement theory and the subsidy theory. I argue that if one 
subscribes to the base-measurement theory, limiting a given 
individual’s charitable deduction to some portion of her income 
is only weakly justified. If, however, one believes that the sub-
sidy theory justifies the deduction, then percentage-of-income 
limits on the subsidy are strongly justified by economic theory. 
A. THE BASE-MEASUREMENT THEORY FOR THE DEDUCTION 
The base-measurement theory, first articulated by Profes-
sor William Andrews, suggests that a deduction for charitable 
transfers is necessary to measure income accurately.59 Starting 
from the Haig-Simons definition of the ideal income tax base as 
accumulation plus consumption,60 Andrews argued that per-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 57. See, e.g., Strom, supra note 48, at A9. One fund-raising consultant 
predicted that KETRA might spur as much as ten billion dollars in charitable 
gifts. See id. 
 58. A second possibility, of course, is that a reason extrinsic to the Code 
and the subsidy process justifies a limit. As explained in the Conclusion, the 
second part of this series argues that limiting the subsidy granted any given 
individual is also justified on political theory grounds extrinsic to tax policy.  
 59. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 309, 309 (1972). 
 60. More specifically, Haig-Simons defines income as the sum of what an 
individual consumes during the taxable period plus the increase in his wealth. 
Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921); see also HENRY C. SI-
MONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (defining income as consump-
tion plus wealth at the end of a tax period less starting wealth). Because this 
definition focuses on purchasing power, most scholars believe it to be the pur-
est definition of what should constitute “income” for purposes of levying an 
income tax in accordance with ability to pay. E.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UN-
TANGLING THE INCOME TAX 16 (1986). Although the Code departs from this 
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sonal consumption, and therefore income, should not include 
amounts expended by an individual for charitable purposes.61 
In other words, such expenditures should be excluded from the 
ideal income tax base. 
As explained by Andrews, “consumption” for purposes of 
measuring taxable income should include only the “private con-
sumption of divisible goods and services whose consumption by 
one household precludes their direct enjoyment by others.”62 
Charitable contributions, he reasoned, deflect resources away 
from private use and toward common goods “whose enjoyment 
is not confined to contributors nor apportioned among contribu-
tors according to the amounts of their contributions.”63 Under 
this reasoning, because any benefit the donor receives is neces-
sarily shared by others, a charitable contribution should not 
constitute consumption.64 In a similar vein, Boris Bittker has 
argued that charitable contributions have such a high moral 
value that they should not be considered consumption, and 
therefore should be ignored when determining the amount of 
income at the voluntary disposal of the taxpayer.65 To these 
ends, some tax theorists believe that allowing a deduction for 
charitable contributions is necessary to define the income tax 
base.66 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
ideal in many important respects, it is considered a benchmark against which 
to measure various aspects of our current system. See, e.g., id.; GRAETZ & 
SCHENK, supra note 21, at 89–91. 
 61. Andrews, supra note 59, at 344–75. 
 62. Id. at 346. 
 63. Id. For example, “a wealthy man cannot purchase and enjoy the sound 
of a new church organ without conferring a benefit on his fellow parishioners 
. . . [and] [a]ttendance at church on a particular Sunday . . . will not imme-
diately prevent someone else from doing the same thing.” Id. at 357–58. Mod-
ern economic terminology refers to such goods as “public goods.” Gergen, supra 
note 14, at 1397. For that reason, some scholars have recharacterized An-
drews’s argument as simply another rationale for subsidizing public goods. See 
id. at 1416. 
 64. Andrews, supra note 59, at 344 –75. 
 65. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Match-
ing Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 46–49, 58–59 (1972); see also Rob Atkinson, 
Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 628 (1990) (arguing 
that charitable transfers should be exempted from tax due to their altruistic 
nature). 
 66. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 59, at 344 –75; McNulty, supra note 17, 
at 233. As explained in note 21, supra, by definition, deductions (as opposed to 
credits) determine the appropriate tax base. In contrast, after one determines 
the tax base and tentative tax, credits then adjust one’s tax liability. Although 
a deduction and a credit each ultimately lower the taxes actually owed, as a 
technical matter, a deduction is the appropriate means of defining the tax 
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B. BASE-MEASUREMENT AND PERCENTAGE-OF-INCOME LIMITS 
If a charitable deduction helps define the ideal income tax 
base, perhaps a limited deduction, rather than an unlimited 
one, most accurately measures income. This section explores 
two alternative conceptions of income measurement under 
which precluding a taxpayer from zeroing out her tax liability 
might be justified. 
1. Measuring Consumption 
Perhaps precluding someone from reducing her taxable in-
come to zero through charitable deductions reflects a notion 
that charitable transfers involve some element of personal con-
sumption and therefore should not be completely exempted 
from taxation. This rationale is initially plausible: giving is vo-
luntary, and donors choose to make donations instead of pur-
chasing wine, vacation homes, or other goods for personal con-
sumption. It is thus possible that donors treat charitable giving 
as another voluntary consumption expenditure. This notion is 
buttressed by the fact that donors receive a variety of benefits 
in return for giving. Some are intangible, such as the “warm 
glow” that accompanies a good deed, the signaling of wealth to 
one’s community, or membership in certain social circles.67 
Other benefits are more tangible, like the ability to enjoy an 
opera or attendance at a benefit party.68 
If charitable giving includes an element of consumption, 
then some limits on charitable deductions should apply.69 This 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
base. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 219–20. To that end, Part II looks 
only at a charitable deduction and a limit on that deduction based on one’s 
AGI. 
 67. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charit-
able Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax 
Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 670–73 (2001); Gergen, supra note 
14, at 1408, 1430; Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of 
Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 574 –77 (1997). 
 68. Colombo, supra note 67, at 670. See also COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHI-
LANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUN-
TARY SECTOR 107–11 (1975); McNulty, supra note 17, at 236. 
 69. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 
186–87 (1985); Bittker, supra note 5, at 165; Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of 
Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 375–77 & n.169 
(1989); Strnad, supra note 21, at 278–86; see also Mark G. Kelman, Personal 
Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why 
They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 849–51 
(1979) (criticizing Andrews’s contention that charitable giving is not consump-
tion in part because donors receive deference, respect, and attention); Stanley 
A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. 
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conclusion, however, does not justify an AGI limit that prevents 
someone from zeroing out her tax liability via charitable contri-
butions. For several reasons, an AGI limit is an ineffective 
means of reflecting the theory that charitable transfers may 
contain elements of consumption. 
First, it makes little sense to tie the amount of a transfer 
that is treated as consumption to the portion of one’s AGI that 
it represents.70 Let’s use the existing fifty-percent limit as an 
example, although the reasoning would apply with equal force 
to any other percentage limit.71 Tying deductibility to AGI in 
this manner creates the following paradox: Someone who con-
tributes forty-nine percent of her income to charity can deduct 
the full amount; no portion of her gifts is treated as consump-
tion. In contrast, once an individual donates more than half her 
income to charity, an increasingly larger portion of her contri-
butions is treated as consumption.72 While donations may have 
different elements of consumption depending on the taxpayer’s 
motives and the intangibles received in return, it is unlikely 
that these are tied to the ratio of the size of the gift to AGI. 
One might argue that the greater the percentage of income 
you donate, the more you value charitable giving, and there-
fore, your donations have a larger element of consumption than 
those of someone who donates a smaller share of her income. 
But this explanation fails on both a theoretical and practical 
level. On a theoretical level, it contradicts common understand-
ings of marginal utility, which suggest that as contributions 
increase, the utility derived from each additional contribution 
decreases, instead of vice versa. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
REV. 679, 707 (1988) (conceptualizing an ideal income tax as taxing the power 
to consume and concluding that spending cash or property on charitable pur-
poses “represents a clear personal benefit to the donor”). 
 70. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 409. 
 71. I emphasize my goal is to explore whether—as a general matter—the 
deduction should be limited to some portion of income and not whether the 
existing limit as currently structured is justified. My criticism is of using any 
percentage of AGI as a baseline, not of using fifty percent per se. 
 72. To illustrate: If a donor contributes sixty percent of her income to 
charity, she can deduct five-sixths of the transfer, an amount equal to fifty 
percent of her AGI. Only one-sixth of her transfer is treated as non-deductible 
consumption. If she instead contributes seventy-five percent of her income to 
charity, she can deduct only two-thirds of the transfer. In that situation, twice 
as much of her transfer—one-third—is treated as non-deductible consumption. 
Under this reasoning, the same $100,000 transfer has differing elements of 
consumption based on what percentage of a donor’s AGI it represents. 
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This “increasing consumption element” justification for the 
cap is also problematic on a practical level. The Code is rife 
with dual-character receipts or expenditures that simulta-
neously contain elements of personal consumption and of non-
consumption, such as employee fringe benefits and work ex-
penses like clothing and commuting. Generally, the Code does 
not differentiate consumption and non-consumption on any 
type of basis unique to the taxpayer in question. Instead, it 
generally determines the treatment of such transactions ac-
cording to the type of transaction, rather than the taxpayer’s 
characteristics.73 
For these reasons, tying deductibility to the portion of a 
donor’s AGI that a gift comprises is an inaccurate method of 
measuring consumption. Moreover, the existence of other types 
of limits that would better measure the amount of consumption 
in a charitable gift suggests the inadequacy of precluding 
someone from zeroing out her taxable income via the charitable 
deduction on that ground.74 Two types of such potential limits 
exist. First, limiting deductibility to some flat percentage of 
each contribution (much like allowing a deduction of fifty per-
cent for business meals)75 would reflect the idea that any cha-
ritable contribution contains both consumption and non-
consumption elements simultaneously, regardless of how many 
other contributions a donor makes, her AGI, or the portion of 
her AGI represented by any given contribution. 
Second, such a limit would likely differ based on the cha-
ritable recipient. For example, it is likely that giving to an op-
era you regularly attend, to your child’s college, or to the local 
museum in exchange for a wing with your name on it has a 
greater element of consumption than giving to a soup kitchen 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 73. Dual-nature expenses and receipts, for administrative ease, are gen-
erally treated one of three ways: (1) as all consumption (commuting), cf. I.R.C. 
§ 162(a)(2) (2000) (allowing a deduction for travelling expenses but not com-
muting); (2) as no consumption at all (most fringe benefits), see, e.g., id. § 132 
(excluding various fringe benefits from income); or (3) the same portion of a 
given transaction is treated as consumption for all individuals (business 
meals), e.g., id. § 274(n) (allowing a deduction up to fifty percent of expenses 
for business meals). 
 74. Obviously, much more can be said about whether and how to structure 
limits on the charitable deduction that are designed to differentiate the con-
sumption and non-consumption elements of a donation. My goal is neither to 
critique that goal, nor to propose a structure for so doing. I make these obser-
vations by way of contrast to illustrate how a limit based on the portion of AGI 
that a donation represents fails to do so. 
 75. Id. § 274(n). 
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or tutoring center across town. Simply limiting one’s deduction 
to some portion of one’s income in and of itself treats all chari-
ties equally, further suggesting that ferreting out consumption 
does not satisfactorily justify such a limit.76 
2. Moral Theory 
Alternatively, percentage-of-income limits might be tied to 
the notion that we have a moral duty to contribute to charity.77 
Many religions hold that we have a duty to help those less for-
tunate, as do many secular conceptions of distributive justice.78 
Bittker and others have argued that this moral duty should 
preclude taxing charitable transfers on the theory that the in-
voluntary nature of a required tithe or other charitable gift 
means that it is not consumption.79 
If required transfers are not consumption, one might argue 
that additional transfers above and beyond what is required 
are voluntary and therefore should be considered consumption. 
This distinction, coupled with the obligations we have to the 
broader community, might suggest the following: that a certain 
percentage of your income is “God’s”80 money—not the govern-
ment’s—on moral grounds and therefore should not be taxed, 
but anything beyond that is fair game for taxation. Under this 
reasoning, a limit based on the percentage of AGI a donation 
represents might be justified as reflecting the contours of one’s 
moral duty to give to charity. It is possible, however, that such 
a limit would be lower than fifty percent, perhaps ten percent 
to reflect traditional tithing requirements. 
This line of reasoning, however, is problematic on two le-
vels. First, it assumes that all charitable organizations have 
equal moral worth and glosses over why a moral duty to give 
exists in the first instance. For example, if religious tithing is 
required to support one’s place of worship or because of a duty 
to help the poor, then such donations have more moral weight 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 76. As explained in Part I, the current rules impose lower percentage lim-
its on contributions to private foundations as opposed to public charities 
(though they do not differentiate among public charities). Part IV.E. addresses 
whether different limits are justified. 
 77. I thank Bill Klein for this suggestion. 
 78. For a readable account of these philosophies, see DANIEL M. HAUSMAN 
& MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
101–33, 174 –208 (1996). 
 79. E.g., Bittker, supra note 65, at 58–59. 
 80. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the 
Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 588–89 (1998). 
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than donations say, to the opera. It is likely that some philoso-
phies would consider certain charities to be morally superior to 
others.81 For the reasons outlined in Part III.B.2, percentage-of-
AGI limits are an inexact means of differentiating among the 
worthiness of various charities. 
Second, this type of limit favors some types of moral phi-
losophies over others. For example, philosophies stemming 
from organized religions often have set rules about how much 
giving is required (such as tithing ten percent of one’s in-
come).82 In contrast, many secular moral philosophies are much 
less specific. They tend to speak in vague terms such as “having 
a duty to ensure equality of welfare by giving to the poor,” but 
generally do not specify what that duty entails.83 Indeed, there 
is a long-standing debate about the best mechanisms for im-
plementing these general philosophies.84 It is therefore imposs-
ible to know what amount of giving is required of individuals 
subscribing to these secular philosophies—and therefore where 
any percentage-of-income limit should be set. Tithing require-
ments are not helpful in this situation, for using them would 
favor religious over non-religious philosophies. Therefore, al-
though a case can be made that moral duty might justify per-
centage-of-income limits as a theoretical matter, practical con-
siderations suggest that moral duty is not the strongest 
justification for such limits. 
III. THE SUBSIDY THEORY 
Turning away from the base-measurement theory, this sec-
tion analyzes whether limiting the charitable deduction to some 
portion of one’s income makes sense under the subsidy theory.85 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 81. For a fuller exploration of how various accounts of distributive justice 
would each shape the contours of the charitable deduction, see Miranda Perry 
Fleischer, Charitable Justice (unpublished article on file with author). 
 82. For a description of Jewish tithing requirements, see generally Adam 
S. Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and the Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX 
REV. 153 (2007).  
 83. Cf. HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 78, at 101–33, 174–208. 
 84. For example, many justify the estate tax on the grounds that moral 
philosophy requires ensuring that everyone has an “equal opportunity.” Tax 
scholars debate, however, what that means in terms of actually structuring an 
estate tax. See, e.g., ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 143–49 (1991); Anne L. 
Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469, 
476–85 (2007); David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Ar-
gument, 6 CAN. J.L. JURIS. 3, 45–57 (1993). 
 85. Because the current subsidy is structured as a deduction, my argu-
ment largely focuses on a deduction limited to some portion of one’s AGI. My 
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It argues that such a limit is not justified by any of the reasons 
that other tax scholars have previously suggested, such as pre-
venting the wealthy from engaging in tax  shelters, protecting 
progressivity, or limiting the subsidy of “rich people’s chari-
ties.” Instead, I argue that under the economic theory for the 
deduction, the structure of our legislative process compels such 
a limit. 
Under the subsidy theory, even if charitable transfers 
should be taxed in a pure Haig-Simons world, a deduction is 
justifiable as a tax expenditure to subsidize charitable activi-
ty.86 A variety of arguments abound as to why charities should 
be subsidized. The more recent and probably more widely ac-
cepted explanation is grounded in economics: subsidizing chari-
ties is necessary to assist them in providing public goods that 
would otherwise be under-produced due to market and go-
vernmental failures.87 
The more traditional explanation is that subsidizing chari-
ties is “good” because of the benefits they provide.88 Some 
theorists focus on the fact that charities relieve the government 
of burdens it would otherwise have to bear (for example, pover-
ty relief).89 Others emphasize the role charities play in provid-
ing creative and diverse solutions to society’s problems, or in 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
argument would apply with equal force to a credit limited to some portion of 
one’s tentative tax liability. 
 86. The deduction subsidizes charity in the following manner. Imagine a 
taxpayer in the thirty-five percent bracket who donates $100 to charity there-
by receiving a $100 deduction. This deduction reduces her tax bill by $35, 
meaning that she transferred $100 to charity at a net cost to her of $65. The 
government has subsidized her transfer to the tune of $35. By lowering the 
price of making charitable gifts, the subsidy is thought to increase a taxpayer’s 
incentive to make them. See Gerald E. Auten et al., Taxes and Philanthropy 
Among the Wealthy, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF TAXING THE RICH 392, 393 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000). Increased giving in 
turn enhances the scope and activity of the charitable sector. The subsidy can 
also be characterized as a matching grant from the government, which 
matches each taxpayer’s donation with a grant equal to thirty-five percent of 
that gift. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998). 
From that perspective, taxpayers can be thought of as individually directing 
the allocation of federal funds. See Bittker, supra note 65, at 39; Paul R. 
McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute 
for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 379–80 (1972). Giving a 
taxpayer a thirty-five cent credit for every dollar donated has the same effect: 
in that case, a taxpayer who gives $100 to charity would receive a $35 credit 
with which to offset her tax bill, subsidizing her transfer by $35. 
 87. See Colombo, supra note 18, at 366; infra Part III.A. 
 88. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 5. 
 89. See id. at 45–58. 
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offering alternative viewpoints in the arts and culture.90 Lastly, 
some scholars highlight the role that nonprofits play in coun-
tering governmental power and enhancing pluralism.91 
Although traditionalists rarely couch their explanations as 
such, their rationales are grounded in the ideas of public goods. 
To them, a vibrant charitable sector is a public good in and of 
itself. Further, many of the good things traditionalists wish to 
subsidize—such as the arts and poverty relief—are public or 
quasi-public goods.92 Thus, the traditional and economic expla-
nations for subsidizing charity do not differ as much as they 
initially seem to.93 To that end, much of what follows addresses 
both strands of the subsidy theory simultaneously. 
A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SUBSIDY THEORY 
The subsidy theory for the deduction94 has three founda-
tional blocks: (1) an economic analysis of the role of charities in 
relation to for-profits and the government; (2) an explanation of 
the need for a subsidy to assist charities in fulfilling that role; 
and (3) the decision that the tax system is the best method of 
providing that subsidy.95 
1. Nonprofit Institutions, Market Failure, and Government 
Failure 
Both the traditional and the economic explanation of the 
subsidy theory rest on the idea that the charitable sector gen-
erally provides public goods. Classic economic theory suggests 
that the market will undersupply public goods96 due to free rid-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 90. Cf. TERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME 204–07 (1990) (dis-
cussing the promotion of social change through charitable arts organizations). 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 234; Bittker, supra note 65, at 39. 
 92. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 5–6. 
 93. See Colombo, supra note 18, at 367 (arguing that a test that focuses on 
whether an organization increases a population’s access to services unavaila-
ble through private markets bridges the traditional and economic subsidy ar-
guments). 
 94. This theory, which scholars use to explain the existence of both the 
charitable deduction and the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations, 
seeks to explain why we subsidize charities through the tax system at all. It 
would therefore apply with equal force if the subsidy for donations was struc-
tured as a credit instead of a deduction. 
 95. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 96. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1397 (“Two qualities define a public (or col-
lective) good: one person’s consumption of the good does not reduce its availa-
bility to others (i.e., the good is nonrival or in joint supply); and no one can be 
excluded from the good (i.e., the good is nonexclusive).”) (citation omitted). 
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ing and positive externalities.97 Either the good remains under-
supplied, or the government or nonprofit sector remedies the 
market failure. Often, the government overcomes the market 
failure in question by “coerce[ing] ‘purchase’ by everyone via 
the power of taxation.”98 As explained below, however, in some 
instances the government cannot or purposefully will not re-
medy the market failure.99 In that case, nonprofits step in to 
help. 
Existing literature suggests that government will remedy a 
market failure by funding a given public good at close to optim-
al levels if demand for that good is relatively homogenous, 
meaning that most voters demand roughly similar amounts of 
the good.100 This argument first assumes that “governmental 
decisions in a democracy are roughly shaped by the desires of 
the majority of the electorate”101 and that the median voter de-
termines the level at which government supplies a given public 
good.102 It concludes that if demand for the good is relatively 
homogenous, then the median voter’s demand for the good 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 97. Gergen explains, “Some people will refuse to pay for a good and rely 
on others to sustain it. Their refusal discourages more conscientious people 
from giving, because even conscientious people may not want to be taken ad-
vantage of by freeriders or they may despair of the possibility of successful 
collective action.” Id. at 1398; see also COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101 
(“If I know that Sarah next door will pay to support the PBS program I watch, 
there is no need for me to pay, as well, because once PBS sends out it [sic] sig-
nal, I can watch ‘for free.’”). 
 98. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101; see also BURTON A. WEIS-
BROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 20 (1988) (explaining that “government can 
finance, subsidize, mandate, or otherwise encourage” remedies to market fail-
ures through its power of taxation). This coerced purchase precludes free-
riding and ensures that individuals do not under purchase public goods with 
large positive externalities. Once the government has coerced the purchase of 
a public good, it can either provide the public good directly (e.g., Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)), or subsidize others to do so (e.g., by 
granting a charitable deduction for donations to a soup kitchen). 
 99. I argue below that the instances where government cannot remedy the 
market failure illustrate the application of the economic strand of the subsidy 
theory. The instances where the government will not remedy the market fail-
ure illustrate the traditional subsidy theory. 
 100. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101–13; Weisbrod, supra 
note 10, at 23; cf. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1403 (arguing that the deduction 
“better matches expense with preference in cases of collective goods for which 
demand is universal but heterogeneous”). 
 101. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102. 
 102. The majoritarian, median-voter framework described above is only one 
possible description of the democratic process. See discussion infra Part IV.E 
for an analysis of this issue using a nonmedian-voter framework. 
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closely mirrors that of voters on each extreme.103 In such cases, 
if the government supplies “enough” of a good to satisfy the 
median voter, it will be very close to supplying “enough” to sa-
tisfy most other voters. Little unmet demand remains.104 
In contrast, the government will be unable to overcome a 
market failure when demand for a given public good is hetero-
geneous, and the amount each voter demands varies. If the 
government supplies enough of the public good to satisfy only 
the median voter, it will fall short of satisfying the high-
demand minority—that is, those who demand more of a given 
good then the median voter.105 I shall term this “accidental” 
governmental failure. The high-demand minority, failed by 
both the market and the government, must seek another solu-
tion to meet its demands.106 One solution lies in the nonprofit 
sector. Individuals who demand more of a given public good 
than the government produces often make voluntary donations 
to nonprofits to produce the good at a satisfactory level.107 
Some readers might object that the median-voter model is 
flawed. I acknowledge this objection, and briefly explore other 
models in Part IV.E. At this point, however, it is important to 
take away from the model that the government, for some rea-
son, cannot overcome a market failure. As Professors Colombo 
and Hall have noted, the conclusion that high-demanders turn 
to nonprofits in the face of government failure does not depend 
on why a government failure occurred.108 
In fact, the term “government failure” may sometimes be a 
misnomer. This so-called failure may not always be bad. In 
some cases, provision by a nonprofit may be preferable to go-
vernmental provision. Maybe the nonprofit sector provides the 
good more efficiently or more creatively than the govern-
ment.109 Perhaps voters wish to avoid sullying the good in ques-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 103. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102. 
 104. Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 22–26. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 26–32. 
 107. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102; see also Weisbrod, supra 
note 10, at 31 (arguing that the size of the voluntary sector in an industry is a 
function of the heterogeneity of population demands). 
 108. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102–03. 
 109. Cf. Atkinson, supra note 65, at 579 (suggesting that private nonprofit 
suppliers may provide goods and services experimentally or informally). For 
example, even voters who support traditional governmental antipoverty pro-
grams such as TANF may also recognize the value in having charities provide 
supplemental mechanisms for reducing poverty. Charities may implement 
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tion with the taint of coerced government funding, preferring 
the moral purity of altruistic funding and production.110 Or 
maybe voters recognize the importance of a strong nonprofit 
sector that can serve as a check on government power and en-
hance pluralism.111 Lastly, sometimes the government cannot 
produce the good in question for constitutional or other reasons, 
as is the case with religious goods.112 
In situations where provision of a good by a nonprofit is 
preferable, voters may refuse to fund a public good—even at 
levels supported by the median voter and even if demand is 
fairly homogenous—on purpose. In other words, the refusal of 
government to provide the public good may stem not from 
shortcomings in the majoritarian process, but from reasoning 
and deliberation. I shall term this “purposeful” government 
failure. 
2. The Role of Tax Subsidies 
In the case of both accidental and purposeful government 
failure, governmental refusal to provide the desired public 
goods leads to production by the nonprofit sector. But why are 
charities then subsidized by the government? If high-
demanders could not convince the government fully to fund the 
good (accidental government failure), why would the govern-
ment agree to subsidize any of it? Alternatively, if high-
demanders could have obtained full government funding but 
chose to forego such funding (purposeful government failure), 
why ask for any subsidies? And why implement the subsidy 
through the tax system? Existing literature provides the follow-
ing explanations. 
a. Subsidies and “Purposeful” Government Failure 
Recall that purposeful government failure occurs when an 
affirmative decision is made to have the nonprofit sector rather 
than government provide a given public good. Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
alternative ways to reduce poverty that the government did not think of, or 
charities may implement similar activities in a more efficient or appealing 
manner. 
 110. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 102–03. 
 111. See ODENDAHL, supra note 90, at 234. 
 112. For an analysis of the constitutional limitations on government fund-
ing of religious entities and activities, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The 
Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 21–30 
(2005). 
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the same free rider and externality problems that inhibit provi-
sion of these goods by the market also plague charities, making 
it difficult for the charitable sector to fulfill the role envisioned 
for it by traditionalists.113 Thus, it is necessary to help charities 
overcome these issues without polluting the attributes that 
make them preferable to government in the first instance. 
Enter the charitable deduction: by lowering the cost of 
supporting such institutions, free-rider problems decrease.114 
By the same token, since the tax subsidy depends upon inde-
pendent acts by nongovernmental actors, all the benefits of 
nongovernmental provision are saved.115 In this manner, the 
charitable deduction is a product of purposeful government 
failure. 
b. Subsidies and “Accidental” Government Failure 
What about the case of accidental government failure? In 
the median voter model conceptualized by existing literature, 
why would the median voter agree to partial funding of goods 
for which she refused to provide full funding? 
Basic economic theory suggests one answer. As the price of 
a good decreases, the amount demanded increases.116 By re-
placing full funding of a public good with only partial funding 
via the deduction, cost is reduced, and the amount demanded 
by the consumer/voter will increase.117 The median voter will 
thus be willing to partially subsidize the good at greater levels 
than she would be willing to subsidize it fully.118 In other 
words, she receives some benefit from increased production of 
the good in question— enough to pay a little more for it via a 
tax subsidy but not enough to pay for all of it.119 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 113. Cf. Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 21, at 225 (arguing that the cha-
ritable sector is subject to free riders who benefit from goods and services 
without making contributions). 
 114. See id. at 225–26 (arguing that relying exclusively on unsubsidized 
voluntary donations increases free-rider problems and that preferential tax 
treatment is one effective remedy). Nonprofits use a variety of additional tools 
to reduce the free-rider problem, such as social pressure, donor recognition, 
appeals to altruism and the like. 
 115. Cf. id. at 226 (arguing that nonprofit charities mitigate government 
monopoly and promote creative projects). Many of the benefits described in 
more detail in Part III.A.2.c. would also apply here. 
 116. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 107–08. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 108; Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 36. 
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A similar rationale is that the subsidy represents a bargain 
among various taxpayers with minority interests.120 The me-
dian voter may agree to provide partial subsidies for public 
goods from which she receives no direct marginal benefit so 
long as she receives something in return—partial funding for 
other public goods from which she will receive a benefit. In oth-
er words, disparate high-demanding minority groups coalesce 
to form a majority that agrees to provide partial funding for 
each other’s projects. 
Professors Colombo and Hall have expressed tax-
exemption for charities in such terms: 
Opera lovers are not willing to pay the full cost of the government 
studying ruffled grouse and vice-versa; but many ruffled-grouse lov-
ers wouldn’t mind paying a little for more opera, and many opera lov-
ers wouldn’t mind paying a little for a bit of ruffled grouse study, es-
pecially if the bargain results in each group getting some help for its 
own preferred interest. Because everyone who has a particular inter-
est subject to government failure benefits from exemption, and be-
cause virtually all segments of society either have such an interest or 
directly benefit from such an interest . . . exemption becomes a me-
thod for government to assist all of society in providing goods and 
services that the private market cannot provide . . . and which the 
government cannot fully provide directly because of structural defi-
ciencies in the democratic system.121 
Although Colombo and Hall were addressing subsidization 
via tax exemption, the same reasoning applies to subsidization 
via the charitable deduction (or credit). It also bears noting that 
the above explanation is not meant to explain Congress’s moti-
vation in implementing the deduction or the events that trans-
pired when Congress did so. Rather, the theory’s proponents 
believe that it helps illuminate the continued existence of tax 
subsidies for charities: taxpayers implicitly recognize and ratify 
post hoc the bargain it represents.122 
c. Subsidies and Taxes 
A question remains: why provide the bargained-for subsidy 
via the tax system instead of governmental grants? As an ini-
tial matter, using a deduction or credit means that individual 
taxpayers decide which charities receive the subsidies and how 
large the subsidies should be.123 Tying the subsidy to the prefe-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 120. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108. 
 121. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108 (citation omitted). 
 122. See, e.g., id. 
 123. See Halperin, supra note 5, at 7. A deduction acts like a matching 
grant: When a taxpayer in the thirty-five percent bracket contributes $100 to a 
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rences of individual taxpayers has several benefits. On a politi-
cal level, this removes the decision about which projects par-
tially to subsidize from the legislature, thus shielding those de-
cisions from the vagaries of the legislative process and 
diminishing the prospect of further government failure.124 The 
matching grant aspect, moreover, means that the charities that 
receive the most donations receive the largest subsidies. This 
allows the subsidies to reflect the electorate’s enthusiasm for 
given charities, which might not happen if the legislature—or 
some agency to which Congress might delegate that decision-
making authority—determined how much of a subsidy each 
charity could receive.125 Moreover, the matching grant is trig-
gered only by an affirmative sacrifice on the part of the taxpay-
er. Indeed, someone who makes a $100 donation and receives a 
deduction is, even after the $35 drop in her tax bill, still out of 
pocket $65.126 This out-of-pocket expenditure may spur taxpay-
ers to think more carefully about which projects they fund and 
to develop other commitments to those projects, such as volun-
teering.127 
This structure also has economic benefits: it helps allocate 
the costs of funding a given charitable good among taxpayers in 
accordance with how much each taxpayer values that good.128 
High-demanders pay “more” by making charitable contribu-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
given charity and receives a $100 deduction, it lowers her taxes by $35. She 
and the government are now partners in the contribution. It has triggered a 
$35 “match” from the government, thus allowing her to allocate $35 of federal 
funds to the charity of her choice. Giving a taxpayer a $35 credit has the same 
effect. 
 124. Some readers may wonder why the legislature would delegate decision 
making in this way. Professor Saul Levmore offers two explanations. The pes-
simistic view is that Congress supported the charitable deduction because 
nonprofits would be “frugal supplicants” and Congress had much to lose by 
favoring some charities over others. The optimistic view is that the deduction 
is a “precommitment” to discourage rent seeking that otherwise might occur. 
Levmore, supra note 86, at 408. 
 125. See id. at 404 –05. 
 126. The same holds true if she instead were to receive a $35 credit. 
 127. See Halperin, supra note 5, at 8; Levmore, supra note 86, at 411, 427–
28. 
 128. See Gergen, supra note 14, at 1400–06 (citing Hochman & Rodgers, 
supra note 21, at 228–35, 238; Strnad, supra note 21, at 271–75) (summarizing 
what economists call the Lindahl solution, in which a collective good is funded 
at a level where the marginal benefit received by both contributors and non-
contributors alike equals their respective marginal costs). Economists disag-
ree, however, as to whether a tax deduction or a tax credit is preferable. Com-
pare Strnad, supra note 21, at 272–76 (supporting a deduction) with Hochman 
& Rodgers, supra note 21, at 236 (supporting a credit). 
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tions. Low-demanders pay “less” by not contributing directly, 
but they still pay something. The subsidies funded by their tax 
bills constitute smaller, indirect payments to charitable goods 
chosen by high-demanders, reflecting the fact that low-
demanders do receive a small benefit from these goods.129 In 
contrast, if the government raised taxes on all citizens to pro-
vide direct grants to charities, it is quite likely that very few 
people’s taxes would rise in proportion to how much they va-
lued the charitable good now subsidized.130 
On the other hand, routing the subsidy through the tax 
system may have some downsides. Some might argue that re-
quiring a financial sacrifice from a taxpayer before allowing her 
to direct federal funds is tantamount to a poll tax requiring 
payment before voting.131 Others question the fact that since 
the current subsidy is structured as a deduction, higher-
bracket taxpayers receive more of a “match” per dollar than 
other taxpayers, and that non-itemizers receive no match at 
all.132 Lastly, maybe this structure is undemocratic in that few-
er citizens are able to influence the allocation of federal funds 
in this manner than via conventional voting, since far fewer 
individuals claim itemized charitable contributions on their tax 
returns than vote.133 Perhaps setting limits on the ability of a 
taxpayer to take a charitable deduction addresses these con-
cerns.134 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 129. For a discussion of whether it is morally fair to force low-demanders to 
subsidize such goods partially, see Gergen, supra note 14, at 1401 n.27. Here, 
the bargain is considered fair because everyone has either the possibility of 
channeling federal funds to his or her project or the possibility of benefiting 
from others’ projects as a recipient of charitable goods and services. 
 130. See id. at 1402 (arguing that voters would be unlikely to support a 
direct subsidy to nonprofits). 
 131. Levmore, supra note 86, at 406. 
 132. See infra Parts III.B. It may be, however, that non-itemizers implicitly 
benefit from the bargain as recipients and patrons of nonprofit organizations. 
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 65, at 55–56; Strnad, supra note 21, at 269.  
 133. See Levmore, supra note 86, at 405–06. For example, approximately 
seventy million people voted in the 2002 midterm election for the House of 
Representatives. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2002: ELEC-
TION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES 5 (2003). In contrast, approximately forty million tax returns reflected 
an itemized charitable deduction. Brian Balkovic, Individual Income Tax Re-
turns, Preliminary Data, 2002, in 23 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, 
SOI BULLETIN 6, 15 tbl.1 (Winter 2003–2004). However, these returns could 
represent more than forty million people as some are joint returns from mar-
ried couples.  
 134. Structuring the subsidy as a refundable credit would equalize the 
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B. THE SUBSIDY THEORY AND EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR 
PERCENTAGE-OF-INCOME LIMITS 
Although the works discussed above help justify a tax sub-
sidy for charitable contributions as well as explore its potential 
flaws, none attempt to justify limiting that subsidy based on 
one’s income (in the case of a deduction) or tax liability (in the 
case of a credit).135 This section analyzes existing theories for 
such a limit under the subsidy rationale and finds that they do 
not hold up under scrutiny, requiring us to look elsewhere for 
potential justification. 
1. Protecting Progressivity 
One common justification for the current limits—based on 
their intended target of high income donors136—is that they an-
swer the recurring criticism that the charitable deduction ad-
versely affects progressivity because it is worth more to a high-
er-bracket taxpayer than a lower-bracket one.137 This raises the 
question whether precluding a donor from zeroing out her tax 
liability by making charitable deductions might protect pro-
gressivity. Perhaps doing so reflects the view that under the 
traditional subsidy theory, any such subsidy must not adverse-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
match given to all charitably inclined citizens, regardless of their tax bracket. 
It would not, however, address the other criticisms levied at the deduction. 
 135. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 99 –113 (addressing whether 
to have a subsidy in the first instance); Hochman & Rogers, supra note 21, at 
238–40 (questioning whether the subsidy should be a deduction or a credit); 
Levmore, supra note 86, at 404 –18 (asking whether the subsidy should flow 
through the tax system); Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 34–37 (addressing 
whether to have a subsidy in the first instance). I do not mean this as a criti-
cism of the subsidy theory itself or of those scholars, who were simply asking 
fundamental questions requiring analysis before any further scrutiny of the 
deduction’s details could occur.  
 136. Although the limitations technically apply to taxpayers in all brack-
ets, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to curb the extent 
to which the wealthy benefit from the charitable deduction. See H.R. REP. NO. 
91-413, at 52–53 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1698–99; S. 
REP. NO. 91-552, at 78–79 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2106–
07; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST 
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 76 
(Comm. Print 1970).  
 137. See MARILYN E. PHELAN & ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, NONPROFIT ORGAN-
IZATIONS LAW AND POLICY 376 (2003) (“The reason for annual limitations on 
the amount of a charitable contribution deduction relates to our progressive 
tax system and the worth of aggregating deductions in one year as opposed to 
spreading such deductions over many years.”). I thank participants at the 
2006 Junior Tax Scholars’ Workshop, University of Colorado, June 16–17, 
2006, for this suggestion. 
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ly affect progressivity in order for it and the nonprofit sector to 
play the positive role envisioned by its proponents.138 Alterna-
tively, perhaps such a cap might reflect a view under the eco-
nomic subsidy theory that certain voters are willing to fund 
others’ pet projects only so long as the overall progressivity of 
the tax system is not impaired.139 
As an initial matter, there is no reason to preclude a tax-
payer from zeroing out her liability to preserve progressivity if 
the subsidy is structured as a credit instead of a deduction. 
This is so because credits have equal value to all taxpayers: a 
tax credit of one dollar reduces the taxes of both a low-bracket 
and a high-bracket taxpayer by one dollar, regardless of their 
marginal rates.140 Non-refundable credits, of course, do not 
benefit taxpayers without any tentative tax liability.141 Howev-
er, any given credit could be made refundable, thus benefiting 
such individuals.142 
Protecting progressivity, therefore, plausibly justifies an 
AGI limit only if the subsidy is structured as a deduction. This 
is so because the criticism that the deduction hurts 
progressivity stems from the “upside-down effect” inherent in 
any deduction: because deductions reduce taxable income, they 
are worth more to higher-bracket taxpayers than lower-bracket 
taxpayers.143 To illustrate, imagine the following hypothetical 
rate structure: 
 
If taxable in-
come is over: 
But not over: The tax is: 
$0        $50,000 10% of the amount over $0 
$50,000        $150,000 $5000 plus 25% of the amount over $50,000 
$150,000        No limit $30,000 plus 50% of the amount over $150,000 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 138. See Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 34–37 (discussing the traditional sub-
sidy theory). 
 139. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 107–08 (discussing the eco-
nomic subsidy theory). 
 140. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case 
for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006). 
 141. Id. at 53–55. 
 142. Id. at 56.  
 143. Id. at 24; Gergen, supra note 14, at 1405. 
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Now imagine three taxpayers, Alex, Bonnie, and Christine, 
who each make a $100 donation. Alex is in the fifty-percent tax 
bracket; his donation reduces his tax bill by $50. Compare 
Bonnie, who is in the twenty-five percent bracket: her deduc-
tion is worth only $25. Christine, who is in the ten-percent 
bracket, is even worse off. Her taxes are reduced by only $10 for 
every $100 that she contributes to charity. Taxpayers in higher 
brackets thus receive more of a subsidy than those in lower 
brackets. For this reason, many scholars feel that this upside-
down effect undermines progressivity.144 Perhaps by limiting 
the deduction available to high-bracket taxpayers in any given 
year, AGI limits protect progressivity.145 
Protecting progressivity is a poor justification for AGI limi-
tations for several reasons. Let’s use the existing fifty-percent 
limit as an example, although the reasoning would apply with 
equal force to any other percentage limit. First, such a limit 
applies only to the extent a taxpayer’s charitable contributions 
exceed fifty percent of her AGI. To continue the previous exam-
ple, if Alex, Bonnie, and Christine each contribute less than 
fifty percent of their income, exactly the same amount of pro-
gressivity results both with and without the limits: Alex’s bene-
fit is twice that of Bonnie’s and five times that of Christine’s.146 
Second, even when this type of limit does apply, it will not 
always limit the magnitude of the upside-down effect because a 
limit based on what portion of AGI a contribution represents 
applies to taxpayers in all brackets.147 If Alex, Bonnie, and 
Christine each give all their income to charity, Alex still rece-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 144. See COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, supra note 68, 
at 108–09; STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 36 (1973); Gergen, 
supra note 14, at 1405; Kelman, supra note 69, at 833 n.7, 856–58; McDaniel, 
supra note 86, at 383. But see Griffith, supra note 69, at 363; Strnad, supra 
note 21, at 271–72. 
 145. Two criticisms of the anti-progressive upside-down effect predominate. 
The first is that charities favored by the rich are over-funded. See infra Part 
III.B.2. The second criticism is that the wealthy are not paying “enough” tax 
relative to their true ability to pay. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the pri-
mary concern of minimum tax issues). I address the concept of the upside-
down subsidy separately, however, because so many other commentators levy 
it, without more, as a criticism of the deduction. 
 146. As currently structured, the general limit on the subsidy affects only 
about one-fifth of donors claiming a charitable deduction, meaning that it has 
no effect on progressivity eighty percent of the time. See supra Part II. Any 
other percentage limit would also be under inclusive, although the percentage 
of taxpayers affected would differ. 
 147. See supra Part I. 
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ives the greatest tax benefit and Christine still receives the 
least. In that case, all that AGI limits do is cut in half the 
amount of the subsidy each taxpayer receives.148 This decreases 
the nominal amount of Alex’s benefit compared to Christine’s 
(instead of benefiting forty cents more per dollar than Chris-
tine, now he only benefits twenty cents more per dollar) but not 
its proportional magnitude. He still benefits five times as much 
as she does.  
To illustrate, imagine that before applying the charitable 
deduction, Alex’s income was $300,000; Bonnie’s was $100,000; 
and Christine’s was $50,000. Using the example rates previous-
ly set forth, after applying the charitable deduction and the 
AGI limitation with the previous corresponding rate structure, 
Alex reduces his income from $300,000 to $150,000 and his tax 
bill from $105,000 to $30,000. Bonnie’s income decreases from 
$100,000 to $50,000 and her tax bill drops from $17,500 to 
$5000. Christine’s income decreases from $50,000 to $25,000 
and her tax bill drops from $5000 to $2500. By reducing Alex’s 
tax bill by $75,000, his $300,000 contribution garnered a 25% 
subsidy from the government. Bonnie’s $100,000 contribution 
cut her tax bill by $12,500 and resulted in a 12.5% subsidy from 
the government. Christine’s $50,000 contribution reduced her 
tax bill by only $2500—a subsidy of only 5%. With or without 
an AGI limitation, Alex receives a benefit that is five times as 
large as the benefit that Christine receives. 
This type of limit diminishes the proportional magnitude of 
Alex’s benefit only if he is the only taxpayer affected by it. As-
sume, for example, that Alex donates all his income to charity 
and Christine donates only half her income. In that case, the 
proportional benefit that he enjoys compared to Christine di-
minishes (before, his benefit was five times as large as hers; 
now it is only two-and-a-half times as large). Even then, how-
ever, this kind of limit does not erase the upside-down effect.149 
To illustrate, first assume that Christine (still with an in-
come of $50,000) contributes half her income to charity. Be-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 148. The same reasoning applies if the limit was something other than fifty 
percent, as it would reduce each taxpayer’s benefit by some other fraction. 
 149. In fact, the existing limits as currently structured only exacerbate this 
problem. When incomes fluctuate over time, the current carry-forwards ex-
acerbate the upside-down effect by essentially allowing income averaging. By 
prohibiting full use of the deduction in Year 1, the limitations preclude that 
deduction from soaking up income taxed at lower marginal rates. Instead, any 
deduction that is carried-over comes off the top of the donor’s highest marginal 
rate in the year used. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 412. 
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cause the limits don’t apply in that event, she can deduct her 
entire $25,000 contribution, resulting in a decrease in her tax 
bill from $5000 to $2500. Consequently, she receives a tax ben-
efit of ten cents for every dollar contributed. Next, assume that 
Alex contributes all his $300,000 income to charity, thereby 
triggering the AGI limit. In the year of contribution, he can de-
duct only half this amount, reducing his taxable income from 
$300,000 to $150,000 and his tax bill from $105,000 to $30,000. 
He now receives a $75,000 tax cut for making a $300,000 con-
tribution, or a tax benefit of twenty-five cents for every dollar 
contributed. 
Limits based on the portion of AGI a contribution 
represents thus protect progressivity only in very narrow cir-
cumstances and only in a limited manner. Because they apply 
only when donations exceed the specified percentage of income, 
they often do not impact progressivity at all. Moreover, even 
when triggered, the limitations merely dampen, and do not 
erase, the upside-down effect. Even if the charitable subsidy is 
structured as a deduction, protecting progressivity is a poor 
rationale for limiting the deduction to some portion of income. 
The best remedy for the upside-down effect, as several scholars 
have thoughtfully suggested, would be to replace the deduction 
with a credit.150 
2. Limiting the Subsidy of “Rich People’s Charities” 
A similar potential rationale for limiting the subsidy avail-
able to any given donor also stems from the current provision’s 
intended targeting of the wealthy.151 Perhaps the AGI limit mi-
nimizes the governmental subsidy of charities favored by the 
wealthy, either as part of an affirmative decision about what 
constitutes a proper charitable sector or as part of the bargain 
about which charities to subsidize. This idea stems from the 
well-documented fact that wealthier taxpayers generally do-
nate to different types of charities than other taxpayers.152 The 
former tend to favor colleges and universities, health institu-
tions, and cultural institutions such as museums.153 In con-
trast, lower-income givers generally favor churches and other 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 150. See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.  
 151. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
 152. Auten et al., supra note 86, at 403–06. 
 153. Id. 
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religious organizations, federated campaigns, and social service 
organizations.154 
Why might limiting the subsidy of “rich people’s charities” 
be desirable? Perhaps this desire reflects a belief that such or-
ganizations are less worthy of a subsidy because they lack a 
strong redistributional component.155 Alternatively, maybe the 
institutions and projects favored by the wealthy—even if as so-
cially worthy as those favored by the non-wealthy—are already 
sufficiently funded or perhaps even over-funded, rendering a 
subsidy unnecessary or even inefficient.156 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 154. Id. 
 155. Subsidizing charity is often justified on the grounds that it helps redi-
stribute income downward. See id. (citing ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF 
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 83 (1982)). However, not all charitable transfers redi-
stribute equally. Id. (“The philanthropy of the wealthy serves many purposes, 
but primarily it assists in the social reproduction of the upper class.”). Gifts to 
Ivy League schools primarily benefit the wealthy students who comprise much 
of the student bodies, while gifts to art museums primarily benefit the upper 
and upper-middle class individuals who patronize such institutions. See id. In 
addition, because health organizations are not required to offer charitable care 
other than open emergency rooms, gifts to such institutions may also lack a 
redistributive element. Colombo, supra note 18, at 347–48. Nevertheless, some 
of the benefits from these types of contributions do extend beyond the wealthy: 
elite schools provide scholarships, a passion for art is not limited to the weal-
thy, and all of society benefits from medical and scientific advances. ODEN-
DAHL, supra note 90, at 232. While fully assessing the redistributional element 
of such charitable contributions is outside the scope of this Article, it is plausi-
ble to suggest that many charitable donations by the wealthy do little to bene-
fit the nonwealthy. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in 
an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263, 318 (2007) (exploring which types of 
charitable transfers contain redistributive elements). Moreover, considerable 
evidence shows that charitable dollars tend to stay “close to home” with re-
spect to the socio-economic status of those benefiting from a given charitable 
donation. See, e.g., Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equali-
ty, in TAKING PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY 27, 36–39 (William Damon & Susan 
Verducci eds., 2006); ODENDAHL, supra note 90, at 232; Auten et al., supra 
note 86, at 397–400, 406. 
 156. For example, evidence exists that capital projects in educational and 
arts organizations are overfunded and that many university endowments are 
much larger than necessary to achieve their goals. See Gergen, supra note 14, 
at 1409 (commenting on overbuilding on college campuses due to “edifice com-
plex”); Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 3, 22 (1990) (“[The] average [university] had an endowment twice 
as large as its current operating budget.”); John Hechinger, When $26 Billion 
Isn’t Enough, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2005, at 1 (noting that the wealthiest col-
leges and universities are “so flush with cash that . . . philanthropy experts 
are starting to wonder whether these schools really need more money”); Joe 
Nocera, The University of Raising Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C1 
(noting that over twenty-five universities are in the process of raising more 
than $1 billion). It might also be desirable to target subsidies to charities pro-
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These desires do not, however, provide a coherent norma-
tive justification for limiting a donor’s charitable subsidy to 
some portion of her AGI (if a deduction is used) or her tentative 
tax liability (if a credit is used). Assuming that there is some 
merit to treating “rich people’s charities” less favorably than 
other charities—and that workable distinctions could be drawn 
between such charities—such a limit is an ineffective means of 
implementing that principle for several reasons. 
First, although there is often a link between donor income 
and the charities favored, there are numerous exceptions.157 
Trying to limit the subsidy given to a particular set of charities 
by targeting the donors who tend to support them is both un-
der- and over-inclusive. In addition to reducing the incentives 
of wealthy individuals who desire to benefit the opera, it would 
also reduce those of wealthy donors who want to support a local 
social service agency. Similarly, it would leave untouched the 
incentives of the non-wealthy who desire to support the ballet 
or some other less-favored “rich person’s charity.”158 
Second, even assuming that the size of a donor’s income is 
a workable proxy for the charities benefited, limiting the subsi-
dy based on percentage of AGI, instead of absolute AGI, is inef-
fective. A percentage-of-income limit, in and of itself, applies to 
taxpayers in all brackets.159 Thus, it affects the incentives of a 
low-bracket taxpayer to donate a large portion of his income to 
the Salvation Army or his church as much as it affects the in-
centives of a high-bracket taxpayer to donate a similar share of 
his income to Harvard or the opera.160 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
viding public goods that would not be provided absent a subsidy due to market 
and governmental failure. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 109; Gergen, 
supra note 14, at 1398. If operas, hospitals, and art museums would exist at 
optimal levels without a subsidy, then why subsidize them? Perhaps, then, 
limiting the ability of the taxpayers most likely to fund these projects and in-
stitutions is a roundabout attempt to remedy inefficient or unnecessary subsi-
dization. 
 157. See Auten et al., supra note 86, at 403–06. 
 158. As demonstrated, limiting the deduction based on the donor’s income 
fails to tailor the size of the subsidy given to various charities when the do-
nor’s income is not a proxy for the charity favored. Consequently, if certain 
charities are to be treated less favorably than others, a more exact solution 
would be to vary the size of the allowable deduction (or credit) based on the 
nature of the recipient charity. I offer these suggestions merely for compari-
son. My goal is not to propose a new structure for the deduction that does dis-
tinguish among charities, but simply to show the AGI limits fail to do so. 
 159. See supra Part I. 
 160.  Comparing the current limits to other possible structures is useful to 
demonstrate that a percentage-of-income limit fails to constrain the subsidy to 
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Lastly, even as applied to wealthy donors, percentage-of-
income limits do a poor job of minimizing the subsidy given to 
charities favored by the wealthy. Take the current fifty-percent 
limit as an illustration. It applies only to the extent a donor 
makes a gift exceeding half her income, leaving most gifts un-
touched.161 When it does apply, it treats the same $1 million 
gift to the ballet differently depending on what portion of the 
donor’s AGI the gift represents. If a donor with an AGI under 
$2 million makes such a gift, some of the deduction is disal-
lowed. But if a donor with an AGI larger than $2 million makes 
the same gift, all of it is deductible. This means that sometimes 
the wealthiest of the wealthy receive a greater subsidy for their 
gifts—which is not what one would expect if the limits were 
meant to limit the subsidy granted to such individuals.162 
3. Backstopping the Preference for Donations of Appreciated 
Property 
It is also plausible that precluding a taxpayer from zeroing 
out her income via charitable donations is justified to offset the 
preference given to donors of appreciated property.163 With 
some exceptions,164 donors can contribute property containing 
substantial unrealized gain, receive a deduction based on the 
property’s fair-market value (FMV), and use that deduction to 
reduce taxable income from other sources (such as salary in-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
“rich people’s charities.” A more direct way of limiting the subsidy given to 
these charities would be to impose limits once a donor’s AGI exceeds some 
absolute limit instead of imposing limits once a gift exceeds some portion of 
the donor’s AGI. A similar structure could be applied if the subsidy was a cre-
dit, looking at a donor’s tentative tax liability relative to some absolute cut-off, 
rather than looking at what portion of her tax bill her charitable credit 
represented. 
 161. Given that donors plan around the limits, perhaps some giving to such 
charities simply doesn’t take place. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 
412. If so, then the limits would have some impact on the amount of subsidy 
given to such charities. 
 162. The same argument would apply if the subsidy were structured as a 
credit limited to some portion of a taxpayer’s bill. 
 163. See Andrews, supra note 59, at 373 (suggesting that the limits minim-
ize this preference but acknowledging that they are a “crude way” of doing so); 
Halperin, supra note 5, at 23–25 (suggesting that this preference influenced 
the repeal of the unlimited deduction but concluding that limits would be un-
necessary if “transfers of property did not allow gain to escape tax”). 
 164. For example, donors of tangible personal property unrelated to a reci-
pient charity’s exempt purpose are limited to a deduction equal to basis. Hal-
perin, supra note 5, at 1. 
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come).165 Because of the realization requirement, this puts do-
nors of appreciated property in a better position than donors of 
cash.166 Maybe limiting the subsidy to some percentage of in-
come or tax liability erases this preference. 
To illustrate the preference given to donors of appreciated 
property, compare Diane, who receives a salary of $1500, with 
Ed, who receives a salary of $600 but also owns stock (with a 
basis of $100) that appreciates by $900 during the year (to an 
FMV of $1000). Economically, both are in the same position; 
each is better off to the tune of $1500. Due to the realization 
requirement, however, Diane’s taxable income is $1500, while 
Ed’s is only $600. He will, however, pay tax on the unrealized 
appreciation when he sells the property, thus putting him 
roughly in the same position as Diane and making the Trea-
sury whole when viewed over time.167 
Now imagine that Diane contributes $1000 cash to charity 
and can deduct that full amount. Using a flat thirty-five per-
cent rate for illustration, her taxable income drops to $500, re-
sulting in a tax bill of $175. Compare Ed, who donates his stock 
with an FMV of $1000 and a basis of $100. If he can deduct the 
full FMV, he ends up with no taxable income in the year of do-
nation, owes no tax that year, and never catches up with Diane 
since he has divested himself of the property before realizing 
any gain from it. Not only is Ed never taxed on the unrealized 
gain from the property donation, he is not taxed on his salary 
income. And if he had other income as well, some of that would 
be offset by the portion of the donation exceeding his salary in-
come.168 
Limiting donors to some portion of their AGI does not, 
however, put Ed on equal footing with Diane. First, this type of 
limit applies to donors of cash as well as property. If, for exam-
ple, a fifty-percent limit applies to both Ed and Diane, the fol-
lowing happens. Based on her $1500 AGI, Diane can only de-
duct $750 of her $1000 cash contribution. This gives her 
taxable income of $750 and a tax bill of $262.50. Based on his 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 165. See id. at 10–11. 
 166. Id. at 13–14. 
 167. Of course, Ed has enjoyed the time value of money in the meantime 
and will likely enjoy preferential rates when he sells. 
 168.  The same distortions would result if the subsidy was a credit based on 
the full fair market value of donated property. Although the mechanics would 
be different, the credit would still enable Ed to offset tax on salary and other 
income. 
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AGI of $600, Ed can only deduct $300 of his $1000 contribution. 
This gives him taxable income of $300 and a tax bill of $105. 
The relative preference given to Ed has lessened, but has not 
disappeared. Ed will still never catch up to Diane, since he gave 
away the property and will never realize gain from it. 
Even limiting Ed to a smaller percentage of his AGI than 
cash donors does not solve this problem. Take, as an example, 
the existing rule limiting taxpayers like Ed to thirty percent of 
their AGI. In that situation, Ed would only be able to deduct 
$180 of his contribution. His taxable income would be $420 and 
his tax bill would be $147, which is still lower than Diane’s tax 
bill. Applying different limits to Ed and Diane minimizes the 
preference, but does not erase it.169 
The only way to erase the preference fully is either to (1) 
limit Ed’s deduction to his basis170 or (2) allow him a FMV de-
duction but force Ed to realize and recognize gain upon donat-
ing appreciated property.171 In both situations, Ed would have 
taxable income of $500, thus putting him on equal terms with 
Diane.172 
That each of these two alternatives erase the preference 
given to donors of appreciated property more thoroughly and 
more directly than percentage-of-income limits suggests that 
this goal, standing alone, may not be the best justification for 
these limits. Given that such limits do reduce the preference 
somewhat, however, this goal may still provide some—but not 
sole—support for precluding a taxpayer from zeroing out her 
tax liability via charitable gifts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 169. Andrews, supra note 59, at 373. Structuring the subsidy as a credit 
limited to some portion of tax liability yields the same result. The preference 
given to Ed would lessen but not disappear, regardless of whether Ed and Di-
ane faced identical or different limits. 
 170. In this situation, he would have gross income of $600 from his salary, 
less a $100 deduction (the amount of his basis), yielding taxable income of 
$500. If a credit was in place, this preference would be erased by calculating 
the credit with respect to the property’s basis and not its fair market value. 
 171. Here, Ed’s gross income would be $1500 ($600 salary plus $900 gain 
from the property), and he could take a $1000 deduction (the FMV of the prop-
erty), giving him taxable income of $500. Alternatively, if a credit was used, 
Ed’s gross income (and his tentative tax bill) would increase due to realization, 
but his credit would be calculated on the full value of the property. 
 172. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 5, at 24 –25 (“[T]rading an unlimited 
deduction for constructive realization would substantially improve the equity 
of the tax system.”). 
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4. A Crude Alternative Minimum Tax 
Of all the existing normative rationales for limiting some-
one’s charitable deduction to some portion of income, the notion 
that doing so serves as an alternative minimum tax has the 
most scholarly support.173 This support stems both from dissa-
tisfaction with other potential justifications and from the legis-
lative history of the existing caps.174 
First, as Steuerle and Sullivan have noted, almost every 
other existing justification for limiting the deduction based on 
how much of one’s income a donation represents ends up in the 
same place: reflecting, on some level, a desire to make sure that 
people do not spend “too much” money on charitable projects 
instead of paying taxes.175 For example, criticism of the upside-
down effect of the deduction often reflects a concern that the 
wealthy are not paying “enough” tax relative to their ability to 
pay. 
The legislative history of the current caps also supports 
this alternative minimum tax idea. As mentioned above, before 
1969, an unlimited income tax charitable deduction was al-
lowed under certain conditions. When Congress repealed this 
allowance,176 it emphasized the unfairness of “allow[ing] a 
small number of high-income persons to pay little or no tax on 
their income.”177 The House Report explained that “[o]urs is 
primarily a self-assessment system. If taxpayers are generally 
to pay their taxes on a voluntary basis they must feel that 
these taxes are fair. Moreover, only by sharing the tax burden 
on a fair basis is it possible to keep the tax burden at a level 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 173. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 190 
(10th ed. 2005) (“[The] limit shows that Congress was unwilling to permit the 
very rich to reduce their taxes to zero by turning over their entire incomes to 
charity and living out of savings.”); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 936 (3d ed. 2006) (“The 
limitations reflect a judgment that no taxpayer should completely avoid feder-
al income tax by making charitable contributions.”); Steuerle & Sullivan, su-
pra note 4, at 414 (“[The cap] most likely is meant to address concerns analog-
ous to those used to motivate a minimum tax—namely, no taxpayer should be 
able to eliminate his or her entire tax liability through a combination of deduc-
tions, credits, and exclusions, no matter how meritorious their purpose.”). 
 174. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 4, at 408. 
 175. Id. at 414. 
 176. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(b), 83 Stat. 487, 
550–53 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(b) (2000). 
 177. H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 152 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1645, 1698. 
  
2008] FAIR SHARES AND CHARITABLE GIVING 203 
 
which is tolerable for all taxpayers.”178 The Senate Report 
echoed these concerns,179 as did the Joint Committee’s Expla-
nation, which noted that “[i]t appeared that the charitable con-
tributions deduction was one of the two most important ite-
mized deductions used by high-income persons, who paid little 
or no income tax, to reduce their tax liability.”180 
While this justification is more sound than other existing 
rationales, it does not go far enough. It does not address what, 
exactly, is unfair about allowing an individual to donate all of 
his income to charity instead of paying tax. The rationale be-
hind the AMT is the concern that in its absence, some individ-
uals could retain substantial economic income for their own use 
that would go untaxed due to tax preferences incentivizing ac-
tivities deemed beneficial to society.181 For example, one oft-
repeated justification for the AMT’s passage in 1969 was a Mrs. 
Dodge, who received $1 million of untaxed income from tax-
exempt municipal bonds.182 While the preference for tax-
exempt bonds183 is thought to benefit society by subsidizing 
state and local government activity, it also directly benefits the 
individual holders of such bonds, who receive the income tax-
free.184 As such, a preference for some municipal bonds is disal-
lowed in the AMT.185 
Many other preferences available under the regular tax 
system but not available under the AMT also directly benefit 
the taxpayer claiming the preference while benefiting society at 
large. For example, § 179186 expensing and accelerated depreci-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 178. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645. 
 179. S. REP. NO. 91-552 at 79 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 
2108. 
 180. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST 
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 76 
(Comm. Print 1970). 
 181. See Michael J. Graetz & Emil Sunley, Minimum Taxes and Compre-
hensive Tax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID IN-
COME-CONSUMPTION TAX 385, 387–88 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988). 
 182. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 768. 
 183. I.R.C. § 103 (2000). 
 184. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax 
Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXA-
TION 19 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (acknowledging that 
holders of tax-exempt bonds receive income free of federal income tax, even if 
that benefit is less than it first appears due to tax capitalization). 
 185.  See I.R.C. § 55(b)(2)(B) (2000). 
 186.  I.R.C. § 179 (West Supp. 2008). 
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ation under § 168187 both benefit society by spurring invest-
ment activity, but also benefit the taxpayer in question by off-
setting otherwise taxable income retained for personal use.188 
To preclude a taxpayer from fully offsetting such income in that 
manner, the AMT requires the use of a less-accelerated depre-
ciation schedule.189 The AMT thus targets tax preferences that, 
although benefiting society, still enable individuals to shelter 
income that they actually retain and use for their own benefit. 
At root, it is the fact that individuals retain untaxed income for 
their own benefit that triggers minimum tax concerns, not the 
use of a deduction in and of itself.190 
In contrast, true charitable contributions do not benefit the 
donor the same way the tax preferences described above do. By 
definition, if one gives money to charity, one does not retain it 
for her own use.191 A complex web of rules that applies to both 
public charities and private foundations is designed to prevent 
taxpayers from (1) creating “sham” charities that benefit do-
nors and other private individuals instead of the community at 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 187.  Id. § 168. 
 188. Cf. Gerard M. Brannon, Tax Expenditures and Income Distribution: A 
Theoretical Analysis of the Upside-Down Subsidy Argument, in THE ECONOM-
ICS OF TAXATION, supra note 184, at 87, 97 (stating that accelerated deprecia-
tion and exclusions encourage high-income individuals to invest by providing a 
higher rate of untaxed return). 
 189.  See I.R.C. § 56 (2000). 
 190.  That said, in some respects, the tax preferences mentioned above 
share one characteristic with the charitable deduction: it could be argued that 
in all cases, the taxpayer is being rewarded with a deduction for doing some-
thing “good” with his money (be it helping charity, spurring investment, or 
assisting localities). To that end, the argument in Section V of this Article may 
also apply to justify limits on other tax preferences as well. For example, per-
haps the AMT’s disallowance of accelerated depreciation reflects a compro-
mise among various groups with different preferences concerning the level of 
business subsidies. Alternatively, the arguments in Section V of this Article 
may justify expanding the AMT to cover charitable donations as an alternative 
to limiting the charitable deduction standing alone. Although this Article con-
cludes that these arguments counsel for percentage-of-AGI limits on the de-
duction as opposed to other types of stand-alone limits within the charitable 
deduction provisions, it does not assess the relative merits of implementing 
these theories within the charitable deduction versus within the AMT. 
 191. As explained supra Part III.B.3, allowing donors of appreciated prop-
erty to deduct the full FMV of such property allows them to use a deduction to 
offset income that they actually retain for their own benefit. Although the 
AMT briefly disallowed a charitable deduction for untaxed appreciation in the 
mid-1980s, it contains no such remedy today. And, while precluding a donor’s 
ability to deduct the full fair market value of appreciated property may well be 
a valid goal, AGI limits are an ineffective means of reaching that goal. See 
supra Part III.B.3. 
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large and (2) reaping personal gain from charities that do bene-
fit the public.192 As with any anti-abuse rule, however, organi-
zations and taxpayers sometimes purposefully evade these 
rules, allowing donors to reap direct benefits from charities to 
which they have contributed.193 In fact, such abuses likely mo-
tivated the enactment of both the AMT and substantial reforms 
of the rules governing charities in the 1969 Tax Reform Act. 
Such abuses cannot, however, justify using percentage-of-AGI 
limits today as a means of taxing individuals who retain other-
wise exempt income for their own benefit. To the extent that 
the current anti-abuse rules allow manipulation by taxpayers, 
they should be tightened. Alternatively, if the rules are clear 
but simply ignored, the rules should be more stringently en-
forced. Limiting a donor’s ability to take a deduction based on 
the percentage of income the gift represents is an over-broad 
means of remedying such abuses. 
Keeping these anti-abuse rules in mind and viewing the 
purposes of a minimum tax in the light described above, the 
question still remains: what is unfair about allowing an indi-
vidual, who does not retain income for her own use but instead 
donates it all to charity, to pay no income tax? 
a. Benefit Theory 
One oft-mentioned possibility is that everyone should pay 
some tax because everyone benefits from certain goods provided 
by the government: roads, sidewalks, national defense, fire pro-
tection, and so on. The problem with this argument, however, is 
that there is generally no link between taxes paid and benefits 
received.194 On a theoretical level, it is hard to determine how 
much someone benefits from the government. Take police pro-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 192. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2008) (precluding a deduc-
tion for contributions to public charities in which the net earnings inure to the 
benefit of private individuals); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (requiring “no private 
inurement” to maintain tax-exempt status); I.R.C. § 4941 (West Supp. 2008) 
(imposing very strict limitations on transactions between private foundations 
and their founders and donors); Id. § 4958 (imposing an excise tax on public 
charities and individuals engaging in acts of private inurement deemed not 
severe enough to warrant loss of exemption). 
 193. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes, Foundation Chief 
Agrees to Repay Over $4M, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2004, at A1 (reporting the 
result of a 2003 Boston Globe investigative series on financial abuses at cha-
ritable foundations that resulted in sanctions against Paul C. Cabot, Jr. for 
draining foundation funds for personal use). 
 194. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Pro-
gressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 451–55 (1952). 
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tection. Do all citizens benefit equally? Do the poor benefit less, 
because the property protected is worth less? Or do they benefit 
more, because they are unable to afford private security?195 On 
a more administrative level, there is no attempt to match taxes 
paid with benefits received. An individual’s taxes fund the fire 
department regardless of whether he or she ever calls them; if 
called, the fire department would respond without regard to 
whether or how much tax an individual paid. Without more 
context, then, the argument that everyone should pay some tax 
because everyone benefits from government does not justify 
limiting the extent to which a given individual can receive a 
deduction (or credit). The tax system is based on ability to pay, 
not benefits received. 
At this point, some readers may argue that all citizens 
benefit from the provision of public sidewalks, for example, and 
if enough citizens did not pay any tax, then public sidewalks 
might be under-funded. This argument basically restates the 
proposition that public sidewalks are subject to free-rider prob-
lems in the market, thus requiring government taxation to 
overcome this problem. The possibility that the government 
may lack enough funds to pay for the sidewalks leads to the 
dual-majority bargain proposed in Part IV. Other readers may 
argue that the benefit theory is not predicated on the purchase 
of specific public goods by a taxpayer, but rather on the pur-
chase of “civilization.” Therefore, since everyone benefits in 
some fashion or another, everyone should pay something. 
Again, however, this raises the question of why, if you are al-
ready “paying” for civilization by giving all your money to a 
charity that provides some type of social good, should you pay 
again in the form of taxes? The next article in this series an-
swers that question. 
b. Optics 
A second oft-mentioned possibility is that it just seems un-
fair to allow some individuals to escape taxation completely—
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 195. Compare id. (arguing that a progressive tax is unjustified because no 
greater benefit is conferred upon higher-income individuals as opposed to low-
er-income individuals such that the rate at which those benefits increase could 
be calculated and made proportional to the rate at which income would be 
taxed) with Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive In-
come Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 491–97 
(1987) (arguing that even though the taxes paid and benefits conferred cannot 
be directly correlated, higher-income individuals benefit from taxes more sig-
nificantly than lower-income individuals). 
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even if they retain no income for their own use. Perhaps prec-
luding taxpayers from zeroing out their tax liability by making 
charitable gifts can therefore be justified on the grounds of op-
tics: allowing someone to pay no tax “undermines public confi-
dence in the tax system by inducing widespread perceptions of 
tax inequity.”196 This perception of unfairness might encourage 
more taxpayers to find ever-increasing ways of avoiding taxes 
by engaging in tax shelters or simply not reporting income.197 
As with the traditional alternative minimum tax argu-
ment, however, this reasoning does not go far enough. It does 
not address what, exactly, seems unfair about not taxing indi-
viduals who have voluntarily donated all their income to a 
cause that by definition benefits the general public. Such indi-
viduals are benefiting society just as much, if not more, than 
individuals who do not contribute to charity but pay taxes.198 
Again, traditional tax policy arguments for a minimum tax do 
not address this point.199 The next section seeks to do so. 
VI.  A BETTER TAX POLICY JUSTIFICATION: THE DUAL-
MAJORITY BARGAIN   
A more compelling rationale for precluding charitable do-
nors from zeroing out their tax liability with their gifts can be 
found by revisiting the economic strand of the subsidy theory in 
the context of our political system. As previously described, the 
subsidy theory conceptualizes charitable tax subsidies as a bar-
gain among various voters to overcome simultaneous market 
and government failures.200 As detailed below, I suggest that 
limiting the subsidy for donations is a necessary second bargain 
(what I call the “dual-majority bargain”) that enables the initial 
bargain to hold. Limiting the deduction or credit is the classic 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 196. Graetz & Sunley, supra note 181, at 388. 
 197. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 28; see also JEFFREY H. BIRN-
BAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 47 (1987) (detailing 
the passage of the Tax Reform Act in 1986, done in large part to fight such 
happenings). 
 198. Take two taxpayers with incomes of $100,000. The first makes no do-
nations and pays $35,000 in tax, which, broadly speaking, benefits the public. 
If the second donates all her income to charity, then she pays $100,000 (far 
more than the first taxpayer!) toward projects that also, broadly speaking, 
benefit the public. 
 199. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 65, at 62 (“If a taxpayer contributes 100 
percent of his income to charities, it is preposterous to suggest his character 
will suffer if he does not pay ‘some’ amount in taxes.”). 
 200. See supra Part III.A. 
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majority’s way of making sure that its priorities in the demo-
cratic process are funded even if it agrees to partially subsidize 
minority projects via the deduction. 
The dual-majority bargain provides a better tax policy jus-
tification for limiting the charitable subsidy available to a given 
donor. As a matter of the subsidy’s structural logic, limiting 
one’s deduction based on what portion of one’s income it 
represents (or limiting a credit based on what portion of one’s 
tax bill it represents) is at least as good as, and likely better, 
than other possible limits in achieving this goal. As a matter of 
broader tax policy goals, however, such a limit balances two 
goals that are sometimes in tension: maximizing the subsidy 
given to charity and addressing the unfairness resulting from 
allowing some individuals to fund only their preferred vision of 
the public good and none of the vision of the public good set by 
their fellow citizens in the democratic process. 
A. LIMITING GENEROSITY TO UPHOLD THE BARGAIN THAT 
MAKES THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION POSSIBLE: THE “DUAL-
MAJORITY BARGAIN” 
My justification for precluding taxpayers from zeroing out 
their taxable income via charitable gifts stems directly from 
existing literature discussing the bargain among minority tax-
payers who coalesce to create a majority for purposes of approv-
ing a tax subsidy in the first instance.201 Recall that Colombo 
and Hall posited that opera lovers would be willing to work 
with ruffled grouse lovers so long as they were repaid in 
kind.202 Once opera lovers and ruffled grouse lovers strike this 
bargain and form a new majority willing to approve partial 
subsidies via the charitable deduction,203 two majority groups 
simultaneously exist. The “classic majority” represents the ma-
jority in which the median voter approves the lighthouse, na-
tional defense, or other projects not subject to government fail-
ure. The “new majority” represents the new group that has 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 201. See supra Part III.A. 
 202. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108. 
 203. I reiterate that this theory does not attempt to explain what actually 
happened in Congress when it implemented the deduction. Rather, this theory 
attempts to justify the continued existence of a deduction or other subsidy: 
people allow it to continue because they implicitly recognize they will lose 
something if it is repealed. Similarly, the dual-majority bargain theory is not 
an attempt to explain what actually occurred when Congress passed the lim-
its. Rather, it attempts to justify their continued existence.  
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coalesced to help fund its members’ pet projects.204 By defini-
tion, some voters are members of both majorities simultaneous-
ly. 
Another bargain must now be struck between these two 
majorities (with members who belong to both majorities weigh-
ing their competing desires), and this bargain is represented by 
limiting the subsidy for charitable donations. The classic major-
ity will agree to subsidize the opera or the ruffled grouse, but 
only if the new majority also agrees to contribute something to 
the lighthouse or national defense. Existing literature ignores 
this second bargain, which I term the “dual-majority bargain.” 
Without that second bargain, high-demanders could substi-
tute completely their view of the public good for the view in-
itially set by the classic majority in the traditional democratic 
process. A cap on the subsidy for charitable donations ensures 
that such individuals may have government subsidize their 
view of the public good, but only if, in return, they also subsid-
ize the goods demanded by the classic majority. Without the 
cap, the bargain among the two majorities might falter, and the 
newly formed majority that has agreed to subsidize its mem-
bers’ minority projects might unravel. 
To take an extreme example, imagine a society in which a 
new majority has approved a charitable deduction (or credit) 
under the bargaining model described above. Next, assume that 
two diseases exist in this society, A and B. Disease A kills only 
a handful of people each year; Disease B kills thousands. Majo-
ritarian preferences as determined by the median voter (the 
classic majority) will likely fund governmental research on Dis-
ease B, but not Disease A. Now suppose the wealthiest member 
of this society, Francie, has a brother who suffers from Disease 
A, and Francie accordingly makes a large donation to a charity 
to fund research on Disease A.205 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 204. I acknowledge that in some instances, preferences other than those of 
the majority may control the legislative process. Because existing literature 
uses a majoritarian model, I use that as my starting point. I explore other 
possible models in Part IV.E.  
 205. This is, of course, an extremely stylized example. Some readers may 
prefer to think of Disease B as representing all of the projects not suffering 
from government failure that the classic majority agrees to fund, and Disease 
A as representing other projects that Francie believes better contribute to the 
public good broadly speaking (whether such projects, as explained supra note 
14, are true public goods, impure public goods, or other projects providing a 
public benefit). 
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Giving Francie an unlimited deduction allows Francie to 
undercut the preferences of the classic majority: theoretically, 
she could pay no taxes at all and thus fund none of the research 
on Disease B.206 If Francie’s tax revenues would otherwise 
comprise a substantial portion of the community’s revenue, this 
would drastically reduce revenue available to fund research on 
Disease B.207 Francie could thus override the preferences ex-
pressed by the classic majority to fund research on Disease B. If 
that were possible, it is unlikely that enough members of the 
classic majority would join those individuals seeking partial 
subsidies for minority projects to form the new majority. 
A cap on the deduction allows both majorities to exist si-
multaneously. The classic majority agrees to subsidize activi-
ties that it does not prioritize (Disease A), but only if individu-
als whose preferences are partly subsidized (that is, members 
of the new majority) also agree to support the majority’s prefe-
rences (Disease B) by paying some tax.208 This bargain-
preserving role justifies the need to prevent taxpayers from ze-
roing out their tax liability by making charitable gifts. 
B. RECOGNIZING THE DUAL-MAJORITY BARGAIN RENDERS 
PREVIOUSLY INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AGI LIMITS 
SATISFACTORY 
Focusing on the dual-majority bargain better answers the 
questions unresolved by existing justifications for precluding a 
taxpayer from zeroing out her tax liability via charitable gifts. 
Recall that Part III.B argued that many of those justifica-
tions—for example, the notion that the limits might enhance 
progressivity or serve as an alternative minimum tax—were 
not satisfying because those explanations did not answer the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 206. That is, fund none of the government projects desired by the classic 
majority. 
 207. Due to the distribution of the tax burden, this is not an impossible 
scenario. In 2002, for example, the top ten percent of taxpayers paid over six-
ty-two percent of federal income taxes. It may be unlikely, however, given the 
government’s ability and propensity to borrow to finance deficit spending. See 
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 21, at 22. 
 208. Although the model I have set forth to this point envisions the classic 
majority as being comprised of individuals voting to fund government projects 
directly, some members may also be individuals who derive other indirect sub-
sidies from the tax system and therefore have a reason to ensure that funds 
continue to flow into that system. See Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mort-
gage Interest Deduction?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 5, 2006, at 78 (noting the 
resistance of real-estate developers to eliminating the mortgage-interest de-
duction).  
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question of why those goals matter. Why make sure the rich 
pay “enough” tax even if they make large charitable gifts? Why 
make sure everyone pays some tax in addition to making dona-
tions that fund public goods? The optics argument explored in 
Part III.B.4 attempted to answer those questions by arguing 
that it “seemed unfair” to exempt from tax someone who do-
nates all her income to charity. This justification, standing 
alone, still does not go far enough: why does not taxing people 
who donate all their income to charity seem unfair? 
Conceptualizing the dual-majority bargain helps answer 
these questions. An unlimited charitable deduction (or credit) 
would allow some individuals to fund only their preferred vi-
sion of the public good and none of the government’s vision of 
the public good. Taken to an extreme, this could leave the gov-
ernment without enough revenue for its own projects. Limiting 
the charitable subsidy achieves two goals: (1) ensuring the gov-
ernment has enough revenue to fund its own priorities and (2) 
precluding individuals with minority preferences from under-
mining the preferences of the majority. Taxpayers must fund 
the government’s specific priorities (and not just the public 
good, broadly speaking) so that individuals with the ability to 
make large donations cannot undercut the legislative process 
and leave the government’s projects underfunded. 
The congressional hearings on the 1969 reforms that re-
pealed the unlimited deduction reflect this concern. It appears 
that some legislators were concerned about the ability of weal-
thy people, through charitable contributions that completely 
erased tax liability, to supplant governmental decisions about 
which goods and services should be provided to the public at 
large and to insert their own decisions about what should be 
provided. For example, one legislator arguing for the AGI limits 
bemoaned the fact that the wealthy could control what services 
are to be provided while “the great mass of the American 
people . . . have to pay for what the great, large, big Govern-
ment decides are the services they are going to render.”209 
Another argued, “We are really concerned over the ability of a 
few individuals to actually appropriate what I would call Fed-
eral funds, because these funds have been short-circuited from 
the Treasury and are under the control of these few wealthy 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 209. Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions: Hearings on Tax Reform 
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong. 1571 (1969) (statement 
of Rep. Byrnes). 
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individuals who decide which goods and services should be pro-
vided.”210 
The legislative debates illuminate the core of the optics ar-
gument. Even if wealthy individuals contribute to society 
through charitable contributions, their choice to give to charity 
in lieu of paying taxes could leave the government without 
enough funds for its own projects. It is the ability to single-
handedly override the preferences of one’s fellow citizens that 
seems unfair.211 Precluding an individual from zeroing out her 
tax liability via charitable contributions ensures that everyone 
contributes something to what his or her fellow citizens deem 
good and prevents individuals from undermining the decisions 
made in the legislative process. The next article in this series 
will argue that liberal democratic theory also justifies this kind 
of limit and that the alternative would, as a matter of political 
theory, be unfair and inconsistent with our democratic struc-
ture. 
C. IMPLEMENTING THE DUAL-MAJORITY BARGAIN 
Identifying the need for a dual-majority bargain, however, 
does not necessarily justify—as a matter of the deduction’s 
structural logic—limiting the deduction to some portion of the 
donor’s AGI. Three types of limits might, as a structural mat-
ter, ensure that the classic majority maintained enough funds 
for its own projects: (1) AGI limits, (2) caps on the portion of 
each contribution that is deductible, or (3) absolute dollar ceil-
ings on the amount a given individual could deduct in a given 
year.212 Thus, percentage-of-income limits are justified as a 
means of implementing the dual-majority bargain only if they 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 210. Id. at 1577 (statement of Rep. Utt, Member, H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means). 
 211. See George F. Break, Charitable Contributions Under the Federal In-
come Tax: Alternative Policy Options, in COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 
AND PUB. NEEDS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RESEARCH PAPERS 1521, 1524 
(1977), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/ 
content_storage_01/0000019b/80/31/88/5f.pdf (suggesting that limits on the 
charitable deduction may be justified because “permitting [some privileged 
individuals] to contribute only to their own privately chosen public goods while 
everyone else has to contribute to collectively chosen public goods is an option 
of dubious merit”); Buckles, supra note 5, at 985–86. 
 212. If the subsidy were via a credit rather than a deduction, the parallel 
limits would be (1) a credit limited to some portion of tentative tax liability, (2) 
percentage caps on the portion of a given contribution that was creditable, or 
(3) absolute dollar ceilings on the amount of credit any given individual could 
use in a given year. 
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are the most appealing of these three options to those involved 
in the bargain. 
A simple analogy helps illustrate the pros and cons of each 
of these three limits. The two majorities are really bargaining 
about how to split the governmental “pie” that is available to 
fund public goods. The pie is comprised of two ingredients: tax-
es received by the government for projects it conducts directly 
and the subsidy given to charitable projects via foregone reve-
nue from the charitable deduction. At some point, the two ma-
jorities reach an agreement about what share of the pie each 
receives, and, for administrative reasons, this will likely be ex-
pressed in a fraction: maybe one side gets one-third and the 
other two-thirds, maybe one side gets one-fourth and the other 
three-fourths, or maybe they agree to split the pie equally. 
Assume, for illustration, that the two majorities agree to 
an equal, fifty-fifty split. This division provides a simple model, 
and, although it is not inevitable, it is quite plausible.213 As a 
starting point, recall that in describing the initial bargain for 
the charitable deduction, Colombo and Hall posited that opera 
lovers are willing to scratch the backs of ruffled grouse lovers 
so long as the favor is returned.214 Arguably, that initial bar-
gain among the minority taxpayers who coalesce to form the 
new majority is maintained over time only if the back-
scratching is roughly equal.215 
Similar reasoning plausibly applies to the second bargain 
between the classic and new majorities that leads to a limited 
deduction. In that interaction, a feasible, attractive end point is 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 213. See infra note 215. 
 214. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 108. 
 215. The arbitrary determination of a fifty-fifty split is not the only result 
that will enable the bargain to hold. However, several experiments on rational 
choice, as well as empirical evidence from actual bargaining situations, show 
that a fifty-fifty split is often used. Plausible explanations are that such a split 
accords with common intuitions of fairness and is an “easy” fraction to under-
stand, rendering it a convenient number to use when reaching a compromise. 
See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1051, 1135 (2000) (describing the “ultimatum game,” in which one person is 
asked to split money between himself and a stranger who can either accept the 
offer or reject it and receive nothing, and finding that the first player will often 
use a fifty-fifty split to divide the money even though it is not in his best inter-
est to do so); H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, Competition and Custom in 
Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 
559, 560–63 (2001) (citing empirical studies of crop-sharing farming contracts 
ranging from Illinois to India where a fifty-fifty split between landlords and 
tenants is most common, regardless of the parties’ relative bargaining powers). 
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that each majority bargains for the possibility of an equal 
amount of government funding for its preferred projects.216 In 
this scenario, the classic majority agrees to the partial subsi-
dies desired by the new majority, and vice versa, but only if 
they split the available subsidies equally. 
With respect to charitable gifts, this means that individu-
als with strong minority interests can have their projects sub-
sidized up to the point where that subsidy equals the amount 
they pay in taxes that fund the classic majority’s projects, but 
no more.217 Returning to our previous example, Francie is al-
lowed to take a charitable deduction of $100 (funneling $35 to 
Disease A) so long as she pays taxes on $100 (funneling $35 to 
Disease B).218 
This means that a bargain has been struck whereby the 
new majority is allowed to use half the pie for its pet projects, 
but no more. The other half must go to the government to fund 
its projects. Of course, members of the new majority might 
choose to forego some or all of their half of the pie, but the key 
is that they have bargained for the option to have half the pie. 
The question then becomes: what type of limit best ensures 
that the new majority can obtain as much of its bargained-for 
half of the pie as it desires?219 As explained below, AGI limits 
best protect that bargain. 
1. Per-Taxpayer Dollar Ceilings and the Dual-Majority 
Bargain 
Applying a dollar ceiling on any given individual’s deduc-
tion splits the pie down the middle only in extremely narrow 
circumstances. To illustrate, first think about the pie in the ag-
gregate as comprised of the gross personal income tax revenue 
collected in a year, without regard to any single taxpayer’s con-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 216. For the classic majority, the funding comes from tax revenue that 
funds the projects approved by the median voter. For the new majority, the 
funding comes in the form of reduced taxes due to the charitable deduction (or 
credit). 
 217. For the reasoning just described, a fifty-fifty split is not the necessary 
endpoint for this bargain either, although it is a plausible one. 
 218. If the subsidy were structured as a thirty-five cent credit for every 
dollar donated to charity (which would be comparable to a dollar deduction for 
every dollar donated), Francie would be entitled to a credit of $35, so long as 
she paid $35 in taxes. 
 219. While this paper employs a fifty-fifty split for purposes of illustration, 
the arguments would apply with equal force to any other division of the pie to 
which the two majorities might agree.  
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tributions. Imagine that the total AGI of all the taxpayers in 
this simplified world would be $3 million, yielding a pie of ap-
proximately $1 million (using a flat thirty-five percent rate for 
simplicity and rounding).220 This means that after a bargain to 
split the pie equally has been struck, the new majority should 
get up to $500,000 in subsidies for its projects. 
Per-person dollar ceilings reflect this division only in a 
static world. For example, consider a per-person ceiling that, in 
the aggregate, allowed taxpayers to deduct up to $1.5 million 
(that is, half of the total AGI of $3 million), thus splitting the 
pie down the middle.221 One could simply divide the aggregate 
allowable deduction of $1.5 million by the number of taxpayers 
in this hypothetical world to arrive at the “correct” per-person 
ceiling. If there were ten taxpayers, each should be allowed to 
deduct up to $150,000; if this world contained fifteen taxpayers, 
each should be allowed to deduct up to $100,000, and so on.222 
If, initially, there are ten taxpayers and each is allowed to 
deduct up to $150,000, an aggregated deductible limit of $1.5 
million results. If the society’s total AGI increases but the per-
person limit stays the same, then the new majority does not get 
its bargained-for half of the pie. It gets $1.5 million, but now 
the classic majority gets all of the increase in AGI. If AGI 
doubles to $6 million, then the classic majority gets seventy-
five percent and the new majority twenty-five percent. Like-
wise, if the per-person limit stays the same but the number of 
taxpayers increases, the new majority benefits more than the 
classic majority. Assume that total AGI stays at $3 million, but 
now this world contains fifteen taxpayers: the new majority can 
deduct up to $2.25 million, or seventy-five percent, and the 
classic majority only gets twenty-five percent.223 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 220. This is so because aggregate taxable income of $3 million and a tax 
rate of thirty-five percent would yield approximately $1 million in tax reve-
nues. 
 221. Under this scenario, taxable income would be $1.5 million, and tax 
revenue would be roughly $500,000. The total amount of charitable deductions 
claimed would also be $1.5 million, yielding a subsidy of roughly $500,000 to 
the donors’ favored projects. 
 222. If the subsidy were a credit, the aggregate allowable credit in this 
example would be roughly $500,000. (Having an aggregate AGI of $3 million 
yields approximately $1 million in tentative tax liability to be split). If there 
were ten taxpayers, the correct per-person credit would be $50,000; if there 
were fifteen taxpayers, the correct credit would be $35,000, and so on. 
 223. The same distortions would result if the subsidy were structured as a 
credit limited with an absolute per-person dollar cap. 
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A per-person cap on the deduction (or credit), therefore, 
splits the pie exactly in the manner bargained for by the par-
ties only in extremely limited circumstances. In the real world, 
AGI fluctuates over time, as does the number of taxpayers.224 It 
is highly unlikely that any single cap would reflect the exact 
bargained-for division of governmental funds. 
Starting from the aggregate pie and then crafting a per-
person limit to divide the aggregate pie does not work in a non-
static world. In the face of changes such as total income or the 
number of taxpayers, the only way to maintain the bargained-
for split of the overall pie is to focus on each individual taxpay-
er’s pie.225 If the two majorities each bargain for half of Alex’s 
pie, half of Bonnie’s pie, half of Christine’s pie, and so forth, 
then, across taxpayers, they will have bargained for half of the 
total pie. Getting the bargain right on the individual level nec-
essarily means that the bargain will be right in the aggregate—
even in the face of changing circumstances—whereas the oppo-
site is not true. 
Per-person dollar ceilings, however, will not get the bar-
gain right on an individual level. Any given per-person dollar 
limit will be more than half of many taxpayers’ incomes, and 
will be less than half of many other taxpayers’ incomes. It will 
only be happenstance that the ceiling constitutes exactly half of 
any given taxpayer’s income. 
On the other hand, per-person dollar ceilings may get the 
overall division roughly correct. Maybe rough justice, coupled 
with the fact that per-person dollar ceilings are easy to under-
stand and are similar to other limits in the Code,226 renders 
them a “good-enough” method of implementing the dual-
majority bargain. While such caps might ensure that each ma-
jority has roughly enough for its preferred set of projects, they 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 224. See Michael Parisi & Michael Strudler, Selected Income and Tax Items 
from Inflation-Indexed Individual Tax Returns, 1990-2004, in 26 STATISTICS 
OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, SOI BULLETIN 75 (Spring 2007), available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/90-04indiv.pdf. 
 225. The above analysis first examined total income in the aggregate to 
determine which per-person limit would implement a bargained-for split of the 
pie. Once a given per-person cap is set, however, it is almost certain that ei-
ther total income or the number of taxpayers will fluctuate. See id. Unless the 
per-person cap fluctuates in tandem with those factors (which would be admi-
nistratively difficult, if not impossible), it will no longer reflect the appropriate 
division of funds. 
 226. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(h) (2000) (imposing a ceiling on mortgage inter-
est deduction). 
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do not address the optics problem described above. This is so 
because the chosen cap will allow some taxpayers, but not oth-
ers, to deduct all their income and thus fund none of the priori-
ties set by the legislative process. The perception that some in-
dividuals might be able to undermine the decisions of their 
fellow citizens still remains. 
Perhaps this perception only matters in the case of wealthy 
people. If so, a low per-person cap isn’t problematic on optics 
grounds. But any realistic per-person cap would likely be fairly 
high,227 thus enabling a large percentage of people to pay no 
tax. If we only cared about requiring the super-ultra-wealthy to 
support government projects, then a high per-person cap would 
still satisfy the optics problem. This, however, raises its own set 
of troubling implications: Why should one set of individuals 
have a different set of obligations vis-à-vis their fellow citizens 
than another set?228 
For this reason, therefore, it seems that a per-person dollar 
cap on the charitable deduction (or credit) is not the best way to 
implement the dual-majority bargain. Although such a cap 
might roughly implement the bargained-for division of funds, it 
would not ensure that each taxpayer contributes not only to 
their pet project but also to the good projects chosen by their 
fellow citizens. Because per-person dollar caps thus do not ad-
dress the optics problem, they are not the most appealing im-
plementation of the dual-majority bargain.  
2. Per-Transfer Limits and the Dual-Majority Bargain 
Per-transfer limits also are not an appealing way of im-
plementing the dual-majority bargain. Such limits would not 
split the pie in the manner bargained for in the dual-majority 
bargain.229 As explained above, the only way to ensure that the 
aggregate pie is split down the middle is to ensure each taxpay-
er’s pie is split down the middle. To illustrate the effect of a 
per-transfer limit, let’s imagine Gail, a hypothetical taxpayer 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 227. This is based solely on intuition. Right now, many large and influenti-
al charities rely heavily on a small number of large gifts (in addition to a large 
number of small gifts). One can only imagine the outcry if individuals could no 
longer deduct more than $500,000, $1 million, $2 million, or even $5 million 
each year. As a matter of political reality, therefore, it seems likely that any 
per-person ceiling would be so high as to be meaningless for most people. 
 228. The next article in this series will address that question on political 
philosophy grounds. 
 229. Although this analysis continues to use a fifty-fifty split as an exam-
ple, the reasoning would apply to any other split the parties made. 
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with income, before charitable deductions, of $100,000 and a 
tax rate of thirty-five percent. Gail’s income produces an indi-
vidual pie of government funds worth $35,000. Under the rea-
soning described above, a bargain has been struck whereby she 
is allowed to use half ($17,500) for her pet projects, but no 
more. The other half must go to the government to fund its 
projects. Of course, Gail might choose not to use any or all of 
her half of the pie, but the new majority bargained for her to 
have that option. 
Will allowing taxpayers to deduct a set percentage of each 
transfer implement the dual-majority bargain in an appealing 
way? The likely answer is no. If Gail’s ability to use the charit-
able deduction is limited on a per-transfer basis, she is cheated 
out of part of her half of the pie unless she transfers all her in-
come to charity. 
To illustrate, if Gail’s only charitable contribution for the 
year is a single $10,000 donation, then she should receive a full 
$10,000 deduction, which would be equivalent to allowing her 
to take out a $3500 piece of the pie for her preferred project. 
This is because the $10,000 deduction lowers her tax bill by 
$3500, generating a $3500 “matching transfer” to her chosen 
charity. If, however, she can deduct only a portion of that 
$10,000 transfer, then she does not receive the full subsidy due 
to her (since she should be able to access a subsidy of up to 
$17,500). A per-transfer limit thus precludes individuals in the 
new majority from receiving their bargained-for share unless 
they contribute their whole income.230 
Moreover, if Gail’s donations exceed her income for the 
year, then the government is cheated out of part of its half of 
the pie. To illustrate, imagine that taxpayers can deduct fifty 
percent of each donation. Next, suppose that despite having an 
income of only $100,000, Gail donates $200,000 to charity. 
Even if she could only deduct fifty percent of each gift, she 
could still take deductions totaling $100,000 and wipe out her 
tax liability. Regardless of the amount of the per-transfer limit, 
Gail could hypothetically donate an amount larger than her 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 230. This reasoning applies regardless of what portion of the pie each ma-
jority bargained for. It applies, for example, even if the new majority bar-
gained for a share of the pie other than a fifty-fifty split. It also holds if the 
subsidy is structured as a credit limited to some portion of each transfer, such 
that it amounts to less than thirty-five cents for each dollar donated to charity. 
In Gail’s example, if she received a credit of less than $3500 for a $10,000 do-
nation, then she would be deprived of the full subsidy bargained for on her 
behalf.  
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income, take deductions totaling more than half her income, 
and thereby deprive the government of part of its half of the 
pie. 
Lastly, per-transfer limits do not fully address the optics 
problem. As demonstrated above, they still allow some individ-
uals potentially to zero out their tax liability via charitable con-
tributions. The unfairness resulting from the ability of some 
individuals potentially to undermine the decisions made by the 
legislative process would thus still remain. 
3. Percentage-of-Income Limits and the Dual-Majority 
Bargain 
A limit based on percentage-of-AGI (or tentative tax liabili-
ty, in the case of a credit), however, solves the problems inhe-
rent in the other two limits. First, unlike per-person dollar 
caps, percentage-of-income limits keep the bargained-for divi-
sion of the pie constant in the face of changes such as aggregate 
AGI and numbers of taxpayers. Second, such limits solve the 
optics problem while ensuring that each majority receives its 
bargained-for division of the pie when its members contribute 
less than their entire income. 
To illustrate, imagine a rule limiting each donor to a de-
duction equal to fifty percent of her income (much like the cur-
rent rule). Until the limit is triggered, Gail may fully deduct 
her transfers and receive as much of her half of the pie as she 
desires. For example, if Gail donates $50,000 or less to charity, 
assuming an income of $100,000, she receives a deduction for 
the entire transfer. She is now able to take as much of her 
share of the pie as she desires, ensuring that the new majority 
has received its bargained-for share of the pie. The same analy-
sis follows if there is a charitable credit instead of a charitable 
deduction. In that situation, Gail should receive the entire thir-
ty-five cent credit for each dollar transferred to charity until 
the point at which her credit equals her tax liability (that is, 
her half of the pie and the classic majority’s half of the pie are 
equal). 
However, once Gail’s donations exceed fifty percent of her 
income, the limits kick in to protect the classic majority. Im-
agine, for example, that Gail donates $60,000 to charity. If she 
could deduct all of it, the governmental subsidy of her pet 
project would be $21,000 (the amount by which her tax bill de-
creases when rates are thirty-five percent) and her taxable in-
come would drop to $40,000, resulting in a tax bill of $14,000. 
  
220 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:165 
 
She would then get more than the bargained-for share of the 
pie, thus hurting the classic majority. 
If, however, Gail can deduct only $50,000 of her transfer, 
that problem is rectified. In that situation, her taxable income 
drops by only $50,000 (instead of $60,000). This reduces Gail’s 
tax bill by only $17,500 (instead of $21,000), accordingly lower-
ing the governmental subsidy of her pet project from $21,000 to 
$17,500. At the same time, her tax bill now rises from $14,000 
to $17,500. The government is now funding her pet project 
equally with the lighthouse: $17,500 of Gail’s pie goes to 
each.231  
Percentage-of-AGI limits (or percentage-of-tax liability lim-
its, in the case of a charitable credit) thus split each individual 
taxpayer’s pie down the middle. Aggregating across taxpayers 
then necessarily splits the total amount of federal funds availa-
ble down the middle as well. In this manner, this limit allows 
members of the new majority to take as much as they want 
from the pie up to the point at which they have taken their 
whole share, but it prevents them from taking more than their 
share. The AGI limits also solve the optics problem by erasing 
the ability of any individual to undermine the decisions of the 
legislative process. When coupled with the structural issues 
addressed above, percentage-of-income limits are therefore the 
best method of precluding a taxpayer from zeroing out her tax 
bill via charitable contributions. Limiting the charitable subsi-
dy in this way reconciles the delivery of public goods through 
the private charitable sector with broader principles of demo-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 231. As a technical matter, due to the increasing marginal-rate structure, 
Gail actually directs something slightly more than fifty percent of her pie to 
her projects and something slightly less than fifty percent of her pie to the 
government’s projects. This is so because her deduction comes off the top of 
her income and results in the subsidy being calculated at her highest marginal 
rate or rates. In contrast, the tax rate applied to her remaining taxable income 
will be the lower rates applicable to her. This distinction between “exactly” 
fifty percent and “really close” to fifty percent is very fine and likely lost on 
most of the individuals involved in this bargain. Allowing a deduction of up to 
fifty percent of AGI “looks like” they are splitting the pie down the middle to 
most people, and, in fact, comes quite close—closer than per-person dollar ceil-
ings or per-transfer limits. If the subsidy were a credit limited to some portion 
of tentative tax liability, then the split would be exact. This is because it does 
not matter whether a one dollar credit comes “off the top” or “off the bottom.” 
A one dollar credit erases one dollar worth of tax liability, however that liabili-
ty was calculated. 
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cratic government, allowing both to co-exist within the same 
system.232 
 
D. The Dual-Majority Bargain, Appreciated Property, and Pri-
vate Foundations  
 
The analysis thus far has employed the current fifty-
percent limit applicable to cash contributions to public charities 
as an example. As explained in Part I, however, the existing 
limit drops to thirty percent for donations of appreciated assets 
to public charities and thirty percent for cash contributions to 
private foundations.233 For donations of appreciated assets to 
private foundations, the AGI limit is twenty percent.234 Would 
the analysis proposed above also justify more stringent limita-
tions in these situations? Perhaps. 
Charities currently receive an additional subsidy when 
someone donates appreciated property. To illustrate, imagine a 
taxpayer with an AGI of $200 who makes a $100 cash donation 
and is in the thirty-five percent bracket. Under the bargain de-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 232. This Article’s framework also applies to the more traditional subsidy 
theory, although the argument is not as precise. No matter how noble or wor-
thy charitable projects are, they are, by definition, not government-funded 
projects. To supporters of the traditional subsidy theory, this is precisely what 
justifies the charitable tax subsidies. Even so, however, it is plausible that 
such traditionalists may not want to take their own arguments too far. 
While some traditionalists may be comfortable with a world in which in-
dividuals can fund only their desired projects and not contribute to govern-
mental projects, it also likely that not all traditionalists are comfortable with 
that scenario and that many supporters of the charitable sector are at least, on 
some level, also supporters of the government. If one supports the charitable 
sector because it provides alternative solutions to social problems, one may 
want to see solutions offered by the government as well. If one supports the 
charitable sector on the grounds that it redistributes power in our society and 
enhances pluralism, one might likely want to create some sort of checks-and-
balances system whereby both the charitable sector and the government 
shared power. 
Lastly, most (but not all) individuals who bump up against the AGI limits 
are wealthier individuals. Perhaps the limits represent a desire to make sure 
that wealthy individuals contribute to the same pot of chosen works as less-
wealthy individuals, so that wealthy individuals do not “opt out” of the com-
mon government and operate solely in the charitable sector. See ODENDAHL, 
supra note 90, at 233 (“In this way the upper class, rather than the majority of 
the population, through a political process, defines the public good.”); id. at 
239 (suggesting that any one person should be limited in her charitable con-
tributions, in a similar manner to the limits placed on political contributions). 
 233.  I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (West Supp. 2008). 
 234.  Id. 
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scribed above, her pie of governmental funds is $70. Allowing 
her to deduct $100 lets her direct $35 of that pie to her pre-
ferred project so long as she funds the classic majority’s 
projects to the tune of $35. 
Now imagine that she also owns some stock with a fair 
market value of $100 and a basis of $20. If she sells the stock 
and then donates $100 cash to charity, she pays tax on the $80 
appreciation. Her pie thereby increases from $70 to $82 (as-
suming she receives the preference for long-term capital gain 
property and is taxed at only fifteen percent). To split her new 
pie equally, each majority should receive $41 for its projects. 
Under current law, however, she pays no tax on the apprec-
iation if she donates the stock itself to charity—keeping her 
official “pie” at $70 and each majority’s share at $35. Allowing 
her a deduction for the untaxed appreciation, however, essen-
tially means that the charity’s subsidy increases by the $12 of 
foregone tax. Now her preferred project receives $47 and the 
classic majority receives only $35—a split no longer in line with 
the initial bargain. 
In this manner, charities currently receive an increased 
subsidy from donations of appreciated property. This additional 
subsidy may well affect the way the two majorities split the pie 
in such situations. To that end, it may be plausible that a dif-
ferent bargain is struck in which taxpayers making donations 
of appreciated property are limited to a smaller percentage of 
AGI. 
What about private foundations, which are usually founded 
by a single donor or family and generally do not operate their 
own charitable activities but instead make grants to other or-
ganizations that conduct charitable activities directly? One 
twist in the private foundation rules is that the foundations are 
required to spend at minimum only five percent of their assets 
each year on charitable activities.235 This minimum includes 
not only grants to other charities but also administrative ex-
penses, like salaries.236  
While, as a normative matter, I believe that private founda-
tions should not be treated differently, supporters of private 
foundations might not be able to strike the same bargain as 
individuals supporting public charities. First, due to the lenient 
minimum pay-out rules, the immediate benefit of funding pub-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 235. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2000). 
 236.  Id. 
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lic goods is delayed. Although donated assets must eventually 
fund such projects, in the interim, they remain under the pri-
vate control of trustees chosen by the founders. Thus, it may 
appear to the classic majority that private foundation suppor-
ters have less to bargain with, in terms of the funding for pub-
lic goods than supporters of public charities. 
Second, any given private foundation attracts financial 
support from far fewer people than any given public charity, 
which by definition must attract at least thirty-three percent of 
its support from the general public.237 Perhaps the knowledge 
that many people support a minority project makes the bargain 
described above palatable with respect to public charities. In 
contrast, the classic majority may be less willing to subsidize 
projects that, by definition, are initially supported only by one 
or a few individuals. In any case, it is plausible that the two 
majorities might split the pie differently in the case of private 
foundations. 
E. THE DUAL-MAJORITY BARGAIN AND NON-MAJORITARIAN 
MODELS OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
As seen above, current literature on the charitable tax sub-
sidies uses a majoritarian median-voter model for simplicity.238 
It conceptualizes the deduction as a bargain among minority 
high-demand voters who come together to create a new majori-
ty to obtain partial funding for their favored projects. Building 
on that model, this Article has argued that percentage-of-
income caps represent a second bargain between the new ma-
jority and the classic majority that ensures each group will re-
ceive funding for its projects.239 
By definition, the median-voter model assumes that the 
preferences of the median voter (as opposed to the preferences 
of individual legislators) shape the decisions of the legisla-
ture—that is, that the legislature accurately reflects the views 
of the voters.240 The prior charitable goods literature using that 
model acknowledges that other models of the legislative process 
exist. It also accurately argues that any political process will 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 237.  See id. § 509(a) (defining a private foundation). 
 238. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 101–13; Gergen, supra note 
14, at 1403; Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 23–25 & n.4.  
 239. See supra Part IV.A. 
 240. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT 132–34 (1962) (describing simple majority voting); COLOMBO 
& HALL, supra note 10, at 102. 
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leave some voters dissatisfied with the level of public goods 
produced, in turn leading to the creation and subsidization of 
the nonprofit sector.241 Although a full analysis of either that 
argument or the percentage-of-AGI limits under alternative 
models is beyond this Article’s scope, a brief preliminary explo-
ration of those issues is warranted. 
There are several models in which legislative decisions 
may not represent the preferences of the median voter.242 The 
most common include: republican theory, classic interest group 
theory, logrolling, and the pivotal politics models.243 Under the 
republican model of the legislative process, it may be the case 
that legislative decisions do not reflect the preferences of the 
electorate of the whole as a result of a reasoned, republican, 
public-minded deliberative process.244 In this model, the prefe-
rences of the electorate are filtered and refined during the care-
ful deliberation that occurs during the legislative process.245 
Legislators’ votes on which public goods to fund will thus reflect 
this reasoned debate, instead of blindly reflecting the prefe-
rences of the electorate.246 
Even after thoughtful deliberation, however, it is quite 
plausible that individual legislators will still have differing 
views about what quantities of various public goods are appro-
priate for the government to fund. Some legislators, therefore, 
will be dissatisfied with the funding allocated to a project that 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 241. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 10, at 103; Gergen, supra note 14, 
at 1399; Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 24 (“For our present purposes we require 
only that the political process leaves significant numbers of voters dissatisfied 
with government output and taxation levels.”). 
 242. See Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 23 n.4 (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The 
Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market 
Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
59, 70 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 1971)). 
 243.  Much more could be said, of course, about how the charitable tax sub-
sidies fare under each framework. I do not claim fully to analyze either the 
subsidies or their limits under these models; such an analysis would be a com-
plete work in and of itself. Nor do I claim to address the full assortment of 
ways in which the legislative process can depart from the median-voter model. 
I do not address, for example, Arrow’s cycling problem. See generally KEN-
NETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). Ra-
ther, I simply aim to offer a few preliminary thoughts about whether the dual-
majority bargain described in this Article is consistent with the basic tenets of 
some of the more common alternative models.  
 244. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
42–47 (1991). 
 245. See id. 
 246. See id.  
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they feel is beneficial to the public good, such as the ballet or 
tutoring programs in rural areas. 
These dissatisfied legislators may come together in a spirit 
of public-mindedness to provide at least some funding, via the 
charitable tax subsidies, for each others’ views of the public 
good. Just as in the median-voter model of the dual-majority 
bargain outlined above,247 however, two majorities of legislators 
still exist simultaneously: one majority voting to fund some 
public goods fully, and another majority voting to fund other 
public goods partially. These two majorities must still reconcile 
their conflicting interests, and capping the tax subsidy for the 
partially funded public goods does just that by ensuring that 
the projects garnering full financial support during the deliber-
ative process will not be undermined. 
Charitable tax subsidies and percentage-of-income limits 
are also consistent with various interest group models of legis-
lation. Take, for example, the classic public choice story in 
which lawmakers provide legislation to the highest bidder. In 
this model, the legislature will fully fund only those public 
goods whose supporters can afford the payments demanded by 
the legislature, with payment in the form of votes, endorse-
ments, contributions, and future favors.248 For example, sup-
porters of a strong national defense may be able to promise 
enough votes (perhaps from military servicemen and women) to 
garner full funding by the government. In contrast, supporters 
of other public goods (for example, community theater) who 
cannot match that price will lose out in the bidding war for leg-
islation and thus fail to garner full funding for their projects.249 
It is quite plausible, however, that by working together, losing 
bidders of disparate charitable projects can afford to “buy” a 
partial subsidy for their projects from the legislature.250 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 247. See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
 248. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 244, at 15 (quoting William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspec-
tive, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975)). 
 249. This is consistent with Mancur Olson’s general observation that sup-
porters of public goods often struggle to influence political activity due to free-
rider problems. Olson also recognizes, however, that some such groups provide 
direct, non-political services to group members, thus making them better 
equipped to overcome free-rider problems. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 132–34 (1965). 
 250. Saul Levmore’s “pessimistic” take on public choice theory and the cha-
ritable deduction is similar. Levmore, supra note 86, at 387–408. Under that 
view, Congress outsources to voters the decision of which public goods to sub-
sidize via the tax subsidies because “legislators . . . have more to lose from 
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Once again, two majorities exist simultaneously: the classic 
majority who has sold full funding of some projects and the new 
majority that has sold partial funding of other projects via cha-
ritable tax subsidies. Once again, these two majorities must 
reconcile their interests. Capping the charitable subsidy en-
sures that the classic majority can still provide full funding of 
some projects to those bidders who can afford it.251 
A logrolling model of legislation (in which various legisla-
tors trade votes with each other to secure funding for their pre-
ferred projects)252 yields a similar analysis, although there are 
two plausible ways for both the subsidy and the cap to arise. In 
the first scenario, similar to the model mentioned above, the 
logrolling process itself produces winners and losers. To illu-
strate, imagine a scenario in which most legislators are rela-
tively indifferent about the level of funding for a given public 
good (Project A), but that supporters of Project A are extremely 
enthusiastic about their support. It might be the case that 
Project A’s supporters trade votes on other issues (perhaps vot-
ing to fund Project B, about which they are indifferent) with 
enough other legislators to gain a majority vote for full funding 
for Project A. In this example, logrolling has allowed some leg-
islators to get exactly what they want. 
Not all legislators, however, have that ability. Assume that 
a third project (Project C) exists, that most legislators are rela-
tively indifferent about the level of funding for Project C, and 
that its supporters are very enthusiastic about their support. 
So far, Project C seems like Project A. It might be the case, 
however, that supporters of Project C are hostile to Project B, 
or otherwise unable to trade votes to obtain funding for Project 
C. Assume the same about supporters of Projects D and E—for 
whatever reason, they cannot successfully logroll to get their 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
favoring some organizations or causes over others than they would gain from 
such favoritism.” Id. at 408. Although Levmore analyzed whether voters (via 
the charitable deduction) or Congress (via direct grants) should decide which 
projects receive subsidies, the point that legislators may not stand to gain very 
much from supporters of charitable causes remains. Id. 
 251. Levmore also offers an “optimistic” view of public choice theory and 
the deduction, which frames the deduction as a “precommitment by Congress 
to refrain from . . . encouraging rent-seeking[] where it might have.” Levmore, 
supra note 86, at 408. A limit on the deduction is also plausible under this 
view; while Congress may precommit not to rent seek in the charitable arena, 
an unlimited deduction could potentially undermine its ability to fund other 
projects and, therefore, rent seek in those areas. 
 252. For an excellent description of logrolling, see BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, 
supra note 240, at 132–42 (1962). 
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projects fully funded. Logrolling, like other models of the legis-
lative process, still produces winners and losers in the legisla-
tive process. 
The traditional economic model for the charitable deduc-
tion, in which dissatisfied voters bargain with each other to ob-
tain part funding for each others’ projects, also applies here. In 
fact, that model is itself a logrolling model, since it suggests 
that supporters of one underfunded project agree to vote for 
partial funding for another project in exchange for partial sup-
port of their project.253 Legislators (or groups thereof) who did 
not have enough “logrolling clout” to obtain full funding are 
nonetheless able, working with other such legislators, to wield 
just enough clout to obtain partial funding for their projects. 
Once again, two majorities of legislators exist simulta-
neously: one majority whose members are able to trade enough 
votes to obtain full funding for their projects and another ma-
jority that is able to trade only enough votes to procure partial 
funding. Once again, these two majorities must reconcile their 
competing interests, and percentage-of-income limits do this. 
They allow the majority with enough clout to trade for full 
funding to ensure that it does, in fact, receive full funding for 
those projects. 
In the second logrolling scenario, the charitable subsidy it-
self may be part of the very vote-trading that results in the 
funding of some goods by the government but not others. For 
example, supporters of a lighthouse might “buy” votes from 
supporters of a community theater by assuring the latter of 
partial funding via a charitable deduction or credit. In this in-
stance, the bargain is not made after the fact and is not solely 
among losing groups. Rather, the bargain is made at the same 
time as the initial set of decisions about what to fund, and is 
between voters who willingly forego full government funding of 
their preferred goods for some reason and those who insist 
upon full funding. 
Again, the essentials of this Article’s proposal still apply: 
percentage-of-income limits serve as a second bargain between 
these two groups that enables the initial bargain to hold. With-
out such limits, the group that supposedly “foregoes” full fund-
ing of its preferred goods and supports full funding of other 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 253. See id. at 135 (providing an example of individual farmers agreeing to 
fund repair of roads for the benefit of other farmers in the township in ex-
change for repair of roads leading to their own farms). 
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goods in exchange for partial funding (and perhaps some other 
benefit) could do an “end-run” around this first bargain. If such 
groups donate all their income to charity and do not pay any 
taxes, then they are not truly supporting full funding of the 
goods they promised to support. 
A final theory in which legislative outcomes do not reflect 
the preferences of the median voter is the pivotal politics mod-
el.254 This understanding of the legislative process posits that 
the complex structure of the legislative process, which includes 
committees, floor debates and potential filibusters, floor votes, 
presidential vetoes, and super-majority veto overrides, some-
times prevents policies supported by the median voter or legis-
lator from enactment.255 This occurs when a piece of legislation 
fails to clear a pivotal veto-gate, such as a filibuster or presi-
dential veto, even if a majority of the legislature supports it.256  
Under this model, to obtain full funding for a given public 
good, it must garner the support of a majority of committee 
members, then a majority of legislators without facing a filibus-
ter by a determined minority, and then either the president (if 
he does not veto such funding) or a super-majority of legislators 
who override a presidential veto.257 Supporters of these goods 
are winners in the legislative process, while legislators whose 
preferred goods do not emerge from all these veto-gates com-
prise an initial set of losers. 
It is entirely plausible, however, that by working together, 
the latter can successfully navigate the political process to ob-
tain partial funding for their projects via the charitable tax 
subsidies. It is also plausible, however, that the actors control-
ling the various veto-gates might insist on capping that subsidy 
so that their preferred projects (which already obtained full 
funding) are not jeopardized. Although this model conceptua-
lizes percentage-of-income limits as a bargain between suppor-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 254. Cf. KEITH KREIEHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 20–48 (1998) (explaining 
pivotal-politics theory). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. at 22–24. 
 257. This model in and of itself does not, of course, explain why the key 
players in this process support the projects they do. The key players might be 
reflecting the preferences of their constituents, or perhaps their support stems 
from deliberate, republican-style deliberation. Alternatively, the support 
might be the product of logrolling or classic interest-group theory. This model, 
which focuses on how structure affects outcomes, can coexist without contra-
diction with the other models of how preferences are shaped within that legis-
lative structure. 
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ters of charitable projects and controllers of the veto-gates, in-
stead of between two majorities, the essential elements remain. 
It is still a bargain between winners and losers in the legisla-
tive process. 
These preliminary thoughts suggest that the framework of 
the dual-majority bargain applies regardless of what model of 
the legislative process is used. In each model, there will be 
winners and losers after the initial decisions about which 
projects to fund fully. As these former losers come together to 
get partial funding for their projects, they become a second set 
of winners. At this point, two sets of “winners” exist simulta-
neously. Limiting the charitable subsidy can be thought of as a 
bargain among these two sets of winners, allowing the two sets 
to reconcile their competing interests. And in each case, for the 
reasons outlined in Part IV.C.3, percentage-of-income limits 
strike this bargain better than other potential limits. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article articulates the first of two justifications for 
precluding charitable donors from zeroing out their tax liabili-
ty. The first stems from the economic subsidy theory for the 
charitable deduction, which posits that a democratic process 
dependent upon majority preferences will supply public goods 
only at the level demanded by the median voter. This majority, 
the “classic majority,” therefore supplies some public goods but 
not others. Individuals supporting the under-supplied public 
goods then coalesce to form a “new majority” that agrees to 
provide partial funding (via a tax subsidy) for each other’s pre-
ferred minority projects. In that manner, charitable tax subsi-
dies allow individuals whose preferences differ from the classic 
majority to redirect a portion of funds otherwise flowing to the 
federal fisc toward their preferred visions of the public good. 
Limiting the deduction to some portion of an individual’s 
income represents a second bargain, this time between the 
classic majority and the new majority. The classic majority will 
fund the new majority’s minority-preferred projects only to the 
extent the new majority agrees to fund the classic majority’s 
preferred projects, and vice versa. Limiting an individual’s cha-
ritable deduction to half of her income implements this bargain 
by ensuring that the amount of governmental subsidy to her 
preferred minority projects will not exceed the amount of taxes 
she pays to fund the classic majority’s projects. This bargain-
saving role is a compelling economic explanation for precluding 
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a taxpayer from erasing her tax liability by making charitable 
contributions. 
The second article in this series will build on this economic 
explanation by arguing that political theory also justifies re-
quiring individuals who donate all their income to charity still 
to pay some income tax. Briefly, as an initial matter, the very 
existence of a tax subsidy for charitable donations reflects the 
notion that citizens in a free and equal society will hold differ-
ing conceptions of the “good.” Limiting the subsidy, however, 
reinforces the scheme of fair cooperation that enables that very 
citizenry with diverse views of the good to come together to 
form a stable and just system of self-governance in the first in-
stance. 
Specifically, a limit that precludes someone from erasing 
his tax liability through charitable donations reflects the notion 
of reciprocity, which is the idea that free and equal citizens will 
reasonably propose terms for cooperation that they believe oth-
er free and equal citizens will reasonably accept.258 Reciprocity 
suggests that one person cannot reasonably agree to terms of 
cooperation for a joint project if she knows others can opt out 
later: allowing others to opt out post hoc undermines the whole 
point of cooperating in the first place and creates instability. 
Precluding citizens from opting out of funding public goods 
identified by a just legislative process and requiring individuals 
who make substantial charitable donations still to pay some 
income tax protects democratic equality and is justified on po-
litical theory grounds. 
Layering political philosophy onto the economic theory of 
the dual-majority bargain will answer the questions left un-
answered in prior justifications for limiting the subsidy granted 
to any given charitable donor. It is “unfair” to let some individ-
uals pay no tax because doing so jeopardizes the ability of the 
classic majority to ensure that the projects it prioritizes retain 
adequate funding. It also denigrates the character of our demo-
cratic system. This explains the appeal of the “crude minimum 
tax” justification that everyone must pay some tax; the appeal 
of the optics argument that it seems unfair for some citizens to 
not pay tax; and the conclusion that even if some people give all 
their income to charity, they are somehow not living up to their 
civic obligations if they pay no tax. 
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